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Reviewing Congressionally Created Remedies for
Excessiveness
COLLEEN P. MURPHY*
Federal courts have struggled with how to review whether a legislatively
created remedy, awarded within monetary ranges specified by Congress, is
excessive under nonconstitutional or constitutional standards. This Article
attempts to solve the puzzle of reviewing legislatively created remedies within
congressional boundaries by employing a broader frame of reference than has
been used by courts and commentators. Drawing on precedents involving not
only review of legislatively created remedies, but also review of statutory fines
payable to the government and criminal sanctions, the Article suggests
guidelines for nonconstitutional and constitutional review of legislatively
created remedies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Highly publicized cases of late have brought to the fore questions of the
proper intersection of authority between Congress, judges, and juries with
respect to remedies.I When Congress creates a statutory cause of action, it often
creates an accompanying legislative monetary remedy--distinct from the
judicially created remedies of compensatory damages, restitution, or punitive
damages. To its legislatively created remedies, Congress typically attaches
monetary boundaries. An example is "statutory damages" for infringement
under the Copyright Act.2 In lieu of actual damages and defendant's profits, the
Act permits the trial decisionmaker to award a "just" amount of statutory
damages within prescribed monetary ranges.3
In two recent lawsuits, juries awarded substantial statutory damages under
the Copyright Act against individuals found to have illegally downloaded and
shared songs. Three federal juries in Minnesota awarded $222,000, $1.92
million, and $1.5 million, respectively, in statutory damages against Jammie
Thomas-Rasset, who had infringed twenty-four songs. 4 A federal jury in Boston
I See, e.g., Assoc. Press, Student's $675,000 Fine Restoredfor Downloading, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 20, 2011, at B10; Joe Barrett, Don't Stop Believing in Risk of Song Sharing,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2010, at A2; Dave Itzkoff, $1.92 Million Finefor Music Piracy, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2009, at C2; John Schwartz, Judge Reduces Fine in Downloading Case,
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2010, at C2.
2 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006); see also infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. For
arguments that courts have misinterpreted the Copyright Act and awarded excessive
copyright statutory damages, see, for example, Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland,
Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 439, 492-97 (2009).
3 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
4 In the litigation against Thomas-Rasset, the first jury awarded $222,000 in statutory
damages, but the district judge ordered a new trial because he believed he had given an
erroneous jury instruction. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas (Thomas-Rasset 1), 579 F. Supp.
2d 1210, 1213, 1226-27 (D. Minn. 2008). The second jury awarded $1.92 million in
statutory damages, but the district judge found that amount excessive under
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awarded $675,000 in statutory damages against Joel Tenenbaum, a university
student who had infringed thirty copyrighted recordings. 5 The district judges in
both lawsuits found that the defendants had not profited appreciably from their
illegal conduct and had caused only slight economic losses to the plaintiff
record companies. 6
Perhaps as a matter of policy, Congress should amend the Copyright Act so
that large awards such as those in Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum are not
possible in similar circumstances. 7 For the courts in these two lawsuits,
nonconstitutional review. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset (Thomas-Rasset Ii), 680
F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1053-54 (D. Minn. 2010). The third jury awarded $1.5 million in statutory
damages, but the district judge found that amount excessive under due process. Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset (Thomas-Rasset 111), 799 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1011 (D. Minn.
2011). On appeal after the district court's decision in Thomas-Rasset I1, the plaintiff record
companies for tactical reasons requested reinstatement of the first jury's award of $222,000.
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, Nos. 11-2820, 11-2858, 2012 WL 3930988, at *4-5
(8th Cir. Sept. 11, 2012). The Eighth Circuit reinstated the $222,000 award, holding that the
amount was not excessive under due process. Id. at *7-10.
5 Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum (Tenenbaum 1), 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 87 (D.
Mass. 2010) (finding jury's award to have been excessive under due process), vacated, 660
F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012), remanded to No. 07-11446-
RWZ, 2012 WL 3639053, slip op. at *6 (D. Mass. Aug. 23, 2012) (concluding jury's award
was not excessive on either nonconstitutional or constitutional grounds). Tenenbaum has
filed a notice of appeal. Defendant's Notice of Appeal, Tenenbaum II, No. 1:07-cv- 11446-
RWZ, 2012 WL 3639053 (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 2012).
6 Thomas-Rasset III, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1007-09; Thomas-Rasset 11, 680 F. Supp. 2d
at 1053; Tenenbaum 1, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 87.
7 Some of the opinions in the Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset lawsuits suggested that
Congress should consider whether to amend the Copyright Act in light of the substantial
awards possible in peer-to-peer file-sharing cases. See Sony BMG Music Entm't v.
Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 490 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012) ("We
comment that this case raises concerns about application of the Copyright Act which
Congress may wish to examine."); Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d
217, 237 (D. Mass. 2009) ("[The court] urges-no implores--Congress to amend the statute
to reflect the realities of file sharing. There is something wrong with a law that routinely
threatens teenagers and students with astronomical penalties for an activity whose
implications they may not have fully understood."); Thomas-Rasset 1, 579 F. Supp. 2d at
1227 ("The Court would be remiss if it did not take this opportunity to implore Congress to
amend the Copyright Act to address liability and damages in peer-to-peer network cases
such as the one currently before this Court.").
In 2008, the recording industry announced that it had abandoned its legal strategy of
suing people for illegally downloading music; it is now working with internet service
providers and colleges and universities to further compliance with copyright law. See Sarah
McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19,
2008, at B1, B7 (discussing plans of Recording Industry Association of America to work
with internet service providers to deter illegal downloading); Simmi Aujla, New Federal
Rules on Internet Piracy Will Not Add a Heavy Burden, College Officials Say, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 28, 2009), available at http://chronicle.com/article/New-Federal-Rules-
on-Intemet/48964/ (discussing federal regulations issued under the Higher Education
Opportunity Act of 2008 that require colleges and universities to have written plans for
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however, a more immediate matter has been presented-should the juries'
awards be set aside as excessive? The lawsuits thus far have produced several
court opinions addressing nonconstitutional and constitutional review for
excessiveness.8 In Thomas-Rasset, the district court deemed the second jury's
award of $1.92 million excessive on nonconstitutional grounds 9 and the third
jury's award of $1.5 million excessive under due process.10 The appellate court,
reviewing the first jury's award of $222,000, determined that the amount did
not violate due process."I In Tenenbaum, one district judge deemed the jury's
$675,000 award excessive under due process, 12 but on remand, a different
district judge decided that the jury's award was not excessive on
nonconstitutional grounds or under due process.13
The Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum lawsuits present an important question
that transcends the context of copyright statutory damages-to what extent may
courts review particular awards of congressionally created monetary remedies?
I suggest that a critical distinction exists, for purposes of both nonconstitutional
and constitutional excessiveness review, between monetary remedies created by
the common law and monetary remedies created by Congress. Because of the
judicial deference due to Congress when it has created the cause of action, the
remedy, and the monetary boundaries of the remedy, excessiveness review of
legislatively created remedies should be more circumscribed than excessiveness
review of judicially created remedies.' 4
Nonconstitutional review of an award of a congressionally created remedy
should be limited to whether the award is consistent with the relevant statutory
language; a reviewing court should not otherwise have the power to set aside
the award as excessive. If Congress has not specified in the statute any factors
that should guide the selection of an amount within the monetary range, then no
judicial review as to amount should occur because Congress has granted
complete discretion to the trial decisionmaker to choose an amount within the
deterring illegal file sharing, including educating their network users about copyright law,
and to offer legal alternatives to downloading protected content).
8 See infra Part II.A.
9 Thomas-Rasset 11, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1053-54.
10 Thomas-Rasset 11, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1011.
I I Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, Nos. 11-2820, 11-2858, 2012 WL 3930988,
at *7-10 (8th Cir. Sept. 11, 2012). On appeal after the district court's decision in Thomas-
Rasset III, the plaintiff record companies for tactical reasons requested reinstatement of the
first jury's award of $222,000. Id. at *4-5; see also infra notes 48-50 and accompanying
text.
12 Tenenbaum 1, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 116 (D. Mass. 2010).
13 Tenenbaum II, No. 07-11446-RWZ, 2012 WL 3639053, slip op. at *7-10 (D. Mass.
Aug. 23, 2012).
14 It is conceivable, although perhaps politically unlikely, that Congress might choose
to codify a pre-existing common law cause of action and create an accompanying remedy
that would completely displace compensatory damages or other common law remedies. My
focus in this Article, however, is on legislatively created remedies for legislatively created
causes of action.
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range. If Congress instead has created statutory factors to guide the choice of
amount within the range, then a reviewing court may consider whether the
award amount is unreasonable in light of those factors. This approach to
nonconstitutional review should apply whether the trial decisionmaker is the
judge or the jury, and it parallels how federal courts have reviewed the severity
of criminal sanctions imposed within statutory ranges.
With respect to constitutional review, the Supreme Court has held that a
statutory provision creating a legislative remedy violates due process only if the
maximum statutory amount is "wholly disproportioned to the offense and
obviously unreasonable."' 15 Lower federal courts should apply this due process
standard leniently, just as those courts have leniently applied, under the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 16 a practically identical
standard to civil and criminal penalties payable to the government. 17 1 reject the
position advanced by some commentators18 and courts19 that Supreme Court
doctrine on due process review of the amount of uncapped punitive damages
should apply also to bounded legislatively created remedies. 20
Under the proposals for nonconstitutional and constitutional review
developed here, the jury awards in Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum were not
excessive. The amounts of the awards pale in comparison to large civil and
criminal fines and lengthy prison sentences that federal courts have routinely
upheld against nonconstitutional and constitutional challenges. 21  The
15 St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919); see also
infra Part IV.A.16 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." (emphasis added)); see also infra
Part IV.B.
17 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (adopting a "grossly
disproportionate to the offense" standard under the Excessive Fines Clause); see also infra
Part IV.B.
18 For arguments that Supreme Court doctrine on due process review of the amount of
punitive damages should also apply to statutory damages, see, for example, Blaine Evanson,
Due Process in Statutory Damages, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 601 (2005) (statutory
damages generally); Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 2, at 464-97 (copyright statutory
damages); Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statutory
Damages and Class Actions, 74 Mo. L. REV. 103 (2009) (statutory damages in class
actions); J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-
Sharing: The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright
Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REV. 525, 536-59 (2004) (copyright statutory damages). For an
argument that Supreme Court doctrine on due process review of punitive damages should
not apply to statutory damages, see Daniel R. LeCours, Note, Steering Clear of the "Road to
Nowhere": Why the BMW Guideposts Should Not Be Used to Review Statutory Penalty
Awards, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 327 (2010).
19See, e.g., Tenenbaum I, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 101 (D. Mass. 2010).
20 See infra Part IV.C.
21 See infra Parts HI.B, IV.B, IV.D; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77
(2003) (concluding that a sentence of life in prison with no possibility of parole for fifty
years for offender under state "three-strikes" law, when offender's third and fourth offenses
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comparison is apt because bounded, legislatively created remedies have an
important similarity to bounded, monetary fines payable to the government and
to statutory ranges for imprisonment. In all three contexts, Congress creates the
remedy or sanction and a maximum amount or length of time that may be
imposed. The legislature's province in defining statutory offenses and creating
and limiting remedies and sanctions for those offenses has deep bearing on the
proper level of nonconstitutional and constitutional review.
I use Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum as a springboard for discussion, but
my proposals for nonconstitutional and constitutional review apply generally to
congressionally created monetary remedies. Part II details the puzzle of
reviewing awards within congressional boundaries. It employs Thomas-Rasset
and Tenenbaum to illustrate questions of nonconstitutional and constitutional
review that arise with respect to legislatively created monetary remedies, and it
describes the variety of such remedies and how those remedies differ from
judicially created monetary remedies. Part III delves into nonconstitutional
review of legislatively created remedies, while Part IV explores constitutional
review.
II. THE PUZZLE OF REVIEWING AWARDS WITHIN CONGRESSIONAL
BOUNDARIES
To identify, in concrete terms, various issues of nonconstitutional and
constitutional review with respect to legislatively created monetary remedies, I
will use the Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum lawsuits as examples. While these
two lawsuits involved copyright statutory damages, there are many types of
legislatively created remedies. I will thus outline several categories of
legislative monetary remedies and how they differ from judicially created
remedies.
A. The Examples of Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum
To highlight the review issues that Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum raise,
we must first briefly consider the definition of "statutory damages" under the
Copyright Act. Under the current version of the Act, a prevailing plaintiff, at
any time prior to final judgment, may "recover, instead of actual damages and
profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the
action, with respect to any one work... in a sum of not less than $750 or more
than $30,000 as the court considers just. '22 The Copyright Act adjusts this
range depending on the infringer's state of mind. If the infringement was
were theft of nine video tapes worth a total of $153, did not violate Eighth Amendment
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003)
(concluding that indeterminate term of life imprisonment for offender under state "three-
strikes" law, when third offense was theft of golf clubs worth approximately $1,200, did not
violate Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause).
22 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006).
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"willful[]," the top of the statutory range increases to $150,000; if the
infringement was innocent, the bottom of the statutory range decreases to
$200.23
In Thomas-Rasset, the plaintiff record companies opted for statutory
damages rather than actual damages and profits. For various reasons, three jury
trials were held. In the first trial, the district judge instructed the jury that
making sound recordings available for distribution on a peer-to-peer online
network, even in the absence of proof of actual distribution, violates the
copyright owner's exclusive rights of distribution. 24 The jury found Thomas-
Rasset to have willfully infringed twenty-four recordings, and it awarded
$9,250 per work infringed, for a total of $222,000 in statutory damages. 2 5 The
judge subsequently ordered a new trial, reasoning that his jury instruction had
been erroneous as a matter of law.26
In the second trial, the jury awarded the record companies $80,000 per song
for a total of $1.92 million,27 after being instructed that it could consider factors
such as the plaintiffs loss, the defendant's gain, the need for deterrence, and the
defendant's state of mind. 28 The district judge found the second jury's award to
be excessive29 under the common law standard that a jury's award of damages
may be set aside when it is "so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of
the court."'30 The cases that the judge cited for this standard of review involved
compensatory damages, not congressionally created remedies. 31 The judge
acknowledged that Congress had chosen the range for copyright statutory
damages, and that the jury's award was within that range, but he asserted
(incorrectly, as I will show) that "there is no authority for Plaintiffs' assertion
that the Court does not have the power to remit an award of statutory
23 If the "infringement was committed willfully," the court may increase the amount up
to $150,000. Id. § 504(c)(2). If the court finds that the infringer "was not aware and had no
reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright," the court may
reduce the amount per infringed work to no less than $200. Id.24 Thomas-Rasset1, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1213 (D. Minn. 2008).25 Id. at 1212-13.
26 1d. at 1216-27.
27 Thomas-Rasset H1, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1050 (D. Minn. 2010).
28 1d. at 1053 (summarizing its instructions to the jury as indicating that "factors other
than the damages caused and gains obtained by the defendant's infringement are relevant to
the decision of the proper amount of statutory damages" and that "[f]acts that go to the
deterrence aspect of statutory damages ... are also relevant").29 1d. at 1050-54.
30 1d. at 1050.
3 1Id. The court cited Taylor v. Otter Tail Corp., 484 F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 2007)
(involving compensatory damages for personal injuries); Eich v. Bd. of Regents for Cent.
Mo. State Univ., 350 F.3d 752 (8th Cir. 2003) (involving compensatory damages for
employment discrimination); Schaefer v. Spider Staging Corp., 275 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2002)
(involving compensatory damages for personal injuries).
2012]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
damages." 32 After characterizing the jury's award as "shocking," 33 the judge
determined that the maximum amount the jury could properly have awarded per
work infringed was $2,250-three times the statutory minimum of $750.34 The
judge reached this number by citing several statutes that allow courts to
multiply actual damages or other awards up to three times.35 He gave the record
companies the choice of accepting a remittitur to $54,000 or proceeding to a
new trial on damages.36
The record companies rejected the remittitur, and the case was tried again in
the fall of 2010, solely on the issue of damages. 37 The new jury awarded
$62,500 in statutory damages per song infringed, for a total of $1.5 million.38
The district judge found the $1.5 million award excessive under due process,
emphasizing that the defendant was "an individual consumer, of limited means,
acting with no attempt to profit."'39 He evaluated the award under St. Louis, Iron
Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Williams,40 a 1919 Supreme Court
decision that involved due process review of a railroad rate statute authorizing
passengers who were overcharged to recover an amount within the prescribed
statutory range.41 The district judge in Thomas-Rasset expressly rejected
applying a much newer body of doctrine created by the Supreme Court to
evaluate whether a punitive damages award is so grossly excessive as to violate
due process. 42 In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore43 and State Farm Mutual
Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell,44 the Supreme Court addressed large punitive
damages awards-ungoverned by any statutory limits on amount-and
developed and applied several guidelines to assess whether such awards are
unconstitutionally excessive. 45
In the Thomas-Rasset constitutional review opinion, the district judge
referenced the trebling statutes cited in the nonconstitutional review opinion and
determined that the maximum amount permitted under due process was $2,250
per infringed work.46 He then amended the judgment to reduce the statutory
32 Thomas-Rasset 11, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1051; see also infra notes 129-40, 145-48,
164-172 and accompanying text.
33 Thomas-Rasset 1I, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.
34 1d. at 1056.
3 5 ld. at 1056-57 (citations omitted).
36 1d. at 1061.
37 Thomas-Rasset 11, 799 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1003 (D. Minn. 2011).
3 8 1d.
3 9 Seeid. at 1011.
40 251 U.S. 63 (1919); see also infra notes 202-17 and accompanying text.
41 Williams, 251 U.S. at 64.
42 Thomas-Rasset 111, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1004-06.
43 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
44 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
45 See infra Part IV.C. 1.
46 Thomas-Rasset I1I, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1001.
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damages award accordingly, without giving the record companies the option of
a new trial.47
On appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
the record companies in Thomas-Rasset sought reinstatement of the first verdict
for $222,000, rather than reinstatement of the much larger third verdict.48 This
choice was rooted in the record companies' desire for an appellate ruling that
the Copyright Act prohibits a person from making copyrighted works available
for distribution without permission from the copyright holder.49 Accordingly,
the record companies argued that the district judge had properly instructed the
first jury on the law and that the first jury's verdict should stand.50 In her cross-
appeal, Thomas-Rasset acquiesced in the record companies' choice to seek
reinstatement of the first verdict rather than the third verdict, but she argued that
the first verdict of $222,000 nevertheless was excessive under due process. 51
Asserting that it did not need to decide the substantive law issue,52 the
Eighth Circuit reinstated the $222,000 award as not excessive under due
process. 53 The appellate court assumed that Williams applied to the
excessiveness inquiry, and it explicitly rejected the defendant's invocation of
Gore and Campbell.54 Moreover, the appellate court asserted that the aggregate
amount for multiple statutory violations, and not just the amount per violation,
is relevant to the Williams due process inquiry.55 In deciding that the $222,000
award was not excessive under due process, the Eighth Circuit criticized the
district judge for "effectively impos[ing] a treble damages limit" as a
constitutional rule. 56
In Tenenbaum, the evidence showed that the defendant, while a college and
graduate student, had illegally downloaded and distributed on peer-to-peer
networks thousands of copyrighted music recordings, and that he continued to
engage in this activity even after receiving a letter from the recording
companies notifying him that they had detected his illegal infringement. 57 The
recording companies sued, alleging willful copyright infringement of only thirty
of the recordings. 58 The district judge who presided at trial, Nancy Gertner,
granted judgment as a matter of law against Tenenbaum on infringement, and
4 7 1d. at 1016.
4 8 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, Nos. 11-2820, 11-2858, 2012 WL 3930988,
at *1 (8th Cir. Sept. 11, 2012).
4 9 1d. at *1, *4-5.
50 1d
5 1 1d. at *5.
52 1d. at *1, *5-7.
53 Id. at *7-10.
54 Thomas-Rasset, 2012 WL 3930988, at *7-10.
5 5 1d. at *10.
561d. at *9.
5 7 Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 492-96 (1st Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012).
58 Id. at 490.
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the jury found that Tenenbaum's infringement was willful.59 After being
instructed on the applicable statutory range of $750 to $150,000 per infringed
work for willful conduct 60 and a nonexhaustive list of factors it could consider
in choosing an amount,61 the jury awarded statutory damages of $22,500 for
each infringed recording.62 The total statutory damages award was $675,000.63
Judge Gertner found that the jury's statutory damages award against
Tenenbaum violated due process; she did not consider whether the amount was
excessive under nonconstitutional review standards. 64 Unlike the district judge
and the Eighth Circuit in Thomas-Rasset, Judge Gertner assumed that
Gore/Campbell applied in evaluating whether the jury's award of statutory
damages was unconstitutionally excessive. 65 Her Gore/Campbell analysis relied
heavily on the assertion that Congress likely did not contemplate the possibility
of such large awards against individual, not-for-profit infringers like
Tenenbaum; she thus gave little deference to the range authorized by Congress
in her due process inquiry.66 Sidestepping Williams, she asserted that the
differences between the approaches of Gore/Campbell and Williams "are, in
practice, minimal," 67 an assertion that this Article will counter. 68 Judge Gertner
also suggested that the aggregation of multiple awards of statutory damages
could present constitutional issues not posed by a single award of statutory
damages. 69
591d.
60 1d. at 489 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006)).
61 Id. at 503-04 (noting that district court had instructed the jury as to a set of
nonexhaustive factors that the jury could consider, including "the nature of the infringement;
the defendant's purpose and intent, the profit that the defendant reaped, if any, and/or the
expense that the defendant saved; the revenue lost by the plaintiff as a result of the
infringement; the value of the copyright; the duration of the infringement; the defendant's
continuation of infringement after notice or knowledge of copyright claims; and the need to
deter this defendant and other potential infringers").6 2 1d. at 490.
63 Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d at 490.
64 Tenenbaum I, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 89 (D. Mass. 2010). Judge Gertner explained that
although avoiding the constitutional issue would always be "the better choice," id. at 88, the
plaintiffs had stated that they likely would not accept a remitted award "under the common
law doctrine of remittitur," id. at 88, 91, and thus at retrial on damages, she "would again be
presented with the very constitutional issues that the remittitur procedure was designed to
avoid" id. at 88.6 51d. at 95-116.
66 Id. at 104 ("Just because the jury's award fell within the broad range of damages that
Congress set for all copyright cases does not mean that the members of Congress who
approved the language of section 504(c) intended to sanction the eye-popping award in this
case.").67 1d. at 101.
68 See infra notes 292-99 and accompanying text.
69 Tenenbaum 1, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 115 (stating that "the reprehensibility of a file
sharer's conduct does not increase linearly with the number of songs he downloads and
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In determining the maximum amount of statutory damages permissible
against the defendant under due process, Judge Gertner in Tenenbaum cited the
Thomas-Rasset opinion in which the district judge found that three times the
statutory minimum of $750 was the maximum amount permissible under
nonconstitutional review. 70 Judge Gertner adopted that amount as the maximum
permissible against the defendant under due process, and she accordingly
reduced the award to $2,250 per infringement, for a total award of $67,500-
one-tenth of the jury's award. 71 She reduced the statutory damages award
outright by amending the judgment; she did not give the recording companies
the option of a new trial. 72
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated Judge
Gertner's due process ruling, reinstated the jury's award, and remanded to the
district court for consideration of "common law remittitur." 73 The appellate
court stated that, under the principle of constitutional avoidance, Judge Gertner
had erred in not considering whether the award was excessive on
nonconstitutional grounds before considering whether the award violated due
process. 74 In using the phrase "common law remittitur," the appellate court in
Tenenbaum, like the district court in Thomas-Rasset, obscured an important
distinction between reviewing remedies created by courts via the common law
process and remedies created and bounded by Congress. 75 As I will show in
shares" and that "the aggregation of statutory damages awarded under section 504(c) may
result in unconscionably large awards").70 1d. at 117.
7 11d. at 117-18.
72 1d. at 88. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fiist Circuit expressed
skepticism as to whether the district court had the power to reduce outright the jury's
statutory damages award without giving the plaintiff the option of a new trial. Sony BMG
Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 513-15 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2431 (2012). The court cited conflicting cases on the power of courts to reduce punitive
damages awards outright. Id. I have previously argued that even when a jury's punitive
damages award is deemed to be so grossly excessive as to violate due process, the Seventh
Amendment prohibits a court from reducing the amount without giving the plaintiff the
option of a new trial. Colleen P. Murphy, Judgment as a Matter of Law on Punitive
Damages, 75 TUL. L. REv. 459, 467-68 (2000); cf Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool
Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 437 (2001) (holding that appellate courts should apply de novo
standard when reviewing district court's determination of constitutionality of punitive
damages award and stating that "[b]ecause the jury's award of punitive damages does not
constitute a finding of 'fact,"' de novo appellate review of the district court's determination
does not violate the Seventh Amendment).
73 Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d at 490; see also id. at 515 n.27 ("We do not take as given the
questionable proposition that in enacting the Copyright Act, Congress intended to eliminate
the common law power of the courts to consider remittitur.").74 1d. at 489-90, 510-11.
75 The Supreme Court has disaggregated the procedural device of remittitur from
common law standards of review for excessiveness. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities,
Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 423 (1996) (mentioning availability of remittitur in a context in which
the standard of review was dictated by state law--"deviates materially from what would be
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Part III, standards of nonconstitutional review, and the manner in which courts
have applied those standards, are different for remedies created by the common
law than for remedies created by Congress.
In terms of due process review, the First Circuit questioned, without
deciding, whether Williams or Gore/Campbell applies to awards of copyright
statutory damages. 76 Moreover, the First Circuit noted that Williams and Gore
concerned state-authorized awards of damages, while Tenenbaum concerned
"[c]ongressionally set awards of damages."7 7 The court continued that "[t]his
fact ... raises concerns about intrusion into Congress's power under Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution." 78 The appellate court instructed that if the district
court on remand determined that the jury's award did "not merit common law
remittitur," the district court and parties would need to address "the relationship
between the remittitur standard and the due process standard for statutory
damage awards." 79
On remand to the district court, the case was reassigned to Judge Rya Zobel
because Judge Gertner had retired from the federal bench.80 Judge Zobel held
that the jury's total statutory damages award of $675,000 was not excessive on
either nonconstitutional or constitutional grounds.8' As directed by the First
Circuit, Judge Zobel evaluated whether "common law remittitur" was
appropriate, and she invoked the common law standard that a jury's award may
be set aside only if it is grossly excessive or shocks the conscience of the
court.82 For this standard, Judge Zobel cited cases that involved compensatory
damages; none involved congressionally created monetary remedies. 83 She
determined that Tenenbaum's conduct, in light of the factors on which the jury
was instructed, supported the jury's award.84 In concluding that the jury's award
reasonable compensation"-rather than the common law standard of "shock the
conscience").
76 Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d at 512-13.
77 1d. at 513.78 Id.
79 1d. at 515 n.28.80 Docket Entry, Tenenbaum II, No. 07-11446-RWZ (D. Mass. Nov. 30, 2011). Upon
retirement from the bench, Judge Gertner accepted a position as Professor of Practice at
Harvard Law School. See Recent News and Spotlights, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2011/02/4_practice.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
81 Tenenbaum II, No. 07-11446-RWZ, 2012 WL 3639053, slip op. at *3, *6 (D. Mass.
Aug. 23, 2012).82 1d. at *2.
83 1d. The cases Judge Zobel quoted were Smith v. Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19, 30 (1st
Cir. 1999) (involving compensatory damages for pain and suffering); Correa v. Hosp. S.F.,
69 F.3d 1184, 1197 (1st Cir. 1995) (involving compensatory damages for wrongful death
and pain and suffering); E. Mountain Platform Tennis, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 40
F.3d 492, 502 (1st Cir. 1994) (involving compensatory damages for repair costs and lost
profits); Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 215 (1st Cir. 1987) (involving compensatory
damages for civil rights, tort, and legal malpractice claims); Segal v. Gilbert Color Sys., Inc.,
746 F.2d 78, 81 (1st Cir. 1984) (involving compensatory damages in employment case).84 Tenenbaum II, 2012 WL 3639053, at *2.
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"was not so excessive as to merit remittitur," Judge Zobel noted that the award
per infringement was only fifteen percent of the applicable statutory maximum
for willful infringement. 85 She observed also that the award was below the
statutory maximum for non-willful infringement.86
Judge Zobel then turned to whether the amount of the jury's award violated
due process. She ruled that Williams, not Gore, governs whether an award of
statutory damages violates due process. 87 Judge Zobel additionally remarked
that "[t]he court is also sensitive to the separation of powers issues raised by a
challenge to a statutory damages range determined by Congress. '88 Judge Zobel
determined that the award did not violate due process because of the "deference
afforded Congress' statutory award determination and the public harms it was
designed to address," the conduct of the defendant, and the fact that the award
was below the statutory maximums for willful and non-willful infringement.89
Tenenbaum has filed a notice of appeal from Judge Zobel's order.90
Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum illustrate that with respect to
congressionally created remedies within monetary boundaries, several issues of
nonconstitutional and constitutional review must be addressed. Most
fundamentally, there are questions concerning the proper standards of review
and how courts have applied various review standards. Within constitutional
review, there is the additional question whether an aggregated award for
multiple statutory violations may be excessive under due process when the
award for a single violation is not. I will explore these questions in detail in
Parts III and IV, but first, it is necessary to sketch the varieties of legislative
monetary remedies and how they differ from judicially created remedies.
B. The Unique Character and Purposes of Legislatively Created
Monetary Remedies
When Congress authorizes monetary remedies for causes of action that it
has created, it may authorize one or more judicially created remedies-remedies
that historically were created by courts via the common law process. The
principal judicially created monetary remedies are compensatory damages for
plaintiff's loss, restitution of defendant's gain, and punitive damages. 91
8 5 d. at *3.
86 Id.
8 71d. at *5-6.88 1d. at *5.
89 d. at *6.
90 Defendant's Notice of Appeal, Tenenbaum II, No. 1:07-cv-1 1446-RWZ, 2012 WL
3639053 (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 2012).
91 Some restitutionary monetary remedies are technically "equitable" as opposed to
"legal." See Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. REv. 1577,
1598-1607 (2002). Beyond the principal monetary remedies of compensatory damages,
punitive damages, and restitution, Congress may also provide for ancillary monetary
remedies, such as attorney fees.
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Alternatively, Congress may fashion new types of monetary remedies, which I
call legislatively or congressionally created remedies. Such remedies include
"damages" (used in the loose sense of a monetary remedy that is not measured
by the plaintiffs actual monetary losses); 92 "liquidated damages"; 93 "statutory
damages"; 94 remedies, such as "treble damages," that are multipliers of
judicially created remedies; 95 and remedies that are not designated by any
term.96 Complicating matters, the term used for a congressionally created
remedy may have different meanings depending on the statute.97
Sometimes, Congress will use the terms "penalties" 98 or "fines" 99 to
describe legislatively created monetary remedies available to private claimants.
More typically, however, Congress uses these terms to apply to civil or criminal
monetary awards that the federal government may obtain. For analytic clarity, I
use the terms "penalties" or "fines" to refer to awards payable to the
92 See, e.g., Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B)
(2006) (authorizing "an action to recover for actual monetary loss ... or to receive $500 in
damages for each such violation, whichever is greater").93 See, e.g., Cable Communication Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551(f)(2)(A) (2006)
(authorizing "actual damages but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of
$100 a day for each day of violation or $1,000, whichever is higher").94 See, e.g., Satellite Home Viewer Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ l19(a)(6)(A)-(B) (Supp. IV
2011) (authorizing, in addition to other monetary remedies under sections 502 through 506
of the Copyright Act, statutory damages not to exceed $2,500,000 for each three-month
period during which a pattern or practice of violation was carried out); 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)
(2006) (providing for "statutory" damages in lieu of actual damages and profits); 47 U.S.C.
§ 553(c)(3)(A) (same).9 5See, e.g., Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. § 305e(b)(2)(A) (Supp. IV
2011).
96 See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 305e(b)(2) (authorizing, as an alternative to trebling the
plaintiffs losses and defendant's gross profits, an award of "not less than $1,000 for each
day").
97 For example, the term "statutory damages" in one statute may be a mutually
exclusive alternative to judicially created remedies, while in another statute, "statutory
damages" may be authorized in addition to judicially created monetary remedies. Compare
Satellite Home Viewer Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ I 19(a)(6)(A)-(B) (authorizing, in addition to other
monetary remedies under sections 502 through 506 of the Copyright Act, statutory damages
not to exceed $2,500,000 for each three-month period during which a pattern or practice of
violation was carried out), with 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2006) (providing for "statutory
damages" in lieu of actual damages and profits for unauthorized reception of cable service),
and 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II) (2006) (providing for "statutory damages" in lieu of
actual damages and profits for unauthorized publication or use of communications by wire
or radio).
9 8 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2006) (authorizing government to
obtain civil "penalties" of up to $25,000 per day per violation); 47 U.S.C. § 338(i)(7)(A)-(C)
(2006) (labeling as "penalties" a section that allows an aggrieved person to recover actual
damages or, alternatively, liquidated damages, plus punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and
litigation costs).
9 9 See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 30707(c) (2006) (authorizing a "fine" to be shared equally
between the person injured and the federal government).
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government that are at least partially punitive and thus subject to the Excessive
Fines Clause.' 00 I use the term "remedies" to refer to awards payable to private
claimants (awards that may or may not have punitive purposes) or awards
payable to the government that lack any punitive purpose.
Regardless of the label, congressionally created monetary remedies
typically differ from judicially created remedies in their purposes, and the
purposes of a particular congressionally created remedy may vary with the
relevant legislative scheme. Also, congressionally created monetary remedies
usually have statutory boundaries for the amount that can be awarded, unlike
judicially created remedies that ordinarily have no statutory limits, even when
the underlying cause of action was created by Congress. 101
1. Legislatively Created Remedies Contrasted to Judicially Created
Remedies
Congress often authorizes a legislatively created remedy that is alternative
or additional to a judicially created remedy. 10 2 Among the statutes authorizing
such legislatively created remedies are those involving consumer protection,
intellectual property, privacy, and communications. 10 3 When Congress
authorizes a legislatively created remedy that is alternative to a judicially
created remedy, it typically either specifies that the plaintiff is entitled to the
greater of the two remedies or it forces the plaintiff to choose between receiving
either the judicially created remedy or the legislatively created remedy. An
example of a "2reater of the remedies" provision is language that authorizes the
plaintiff "to recover for actual monetary loss ... or to receive $500 in damages
for each ... violation, whichever is greater." 10 4 An example of a provision
100 See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
101 Congress rarely has capped common law remedies. See infra note 312 and
accompanying text.
102 Congress sometimes uses terms such as "actual damages" or "economic loss," which
are subsets of the judicially created remedy of compensatory damages. "Actual profits" is a
subset of restitution-a body of remedial law created historically by courts.103 See infra note 104.
104 Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) (2006).
Other examples of statutes authorizing the plaintiff to recover the greater of the legislatively
created remedy versus the judicial remedies include: 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(1)(A) (2006)
(providing that "the court shall assess the greater of the sum of actual damages suffered by
the plaintiff, or statutory damages of not less than $50 and not more than $500"); Stored
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c) (2006) (stating that a plaintiff is entitled to "the
sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as a
result of the violation, but in no case shall a person entitled to recover receive less than the
sum of $1,000"); 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(2)(A) (2006) (providing that for wrongful disclosure
of videotape rental or sale records, court may award, in part, "actual damages but not less
than liquidated damages in an amount of $2,500"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-6(t) (2006) (in action
against governmental unit for search or seizure unlawful under the statute, plaintiff "shall be
entitled to recover actual damages but not less than liquidated damages of $1,000"); Cable
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requiring the plaintiff to choose between the legislatively created remedy and
the judicially created remedy is the Copyright Act language that "the copyright
owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover,
instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages."'10 5 When
Congress authorizes legislatively created remedies that are additional to
judicially created remedies, it often chooses to allow up to double or treble the
amount of compensatory damages or defendant's profits10 6 or to authorize an
award within a specified monetary range to supplement those damages or
profits.107
When Congress authorizes a legislatively created remedy as alternative or
additional to judicially created remedies, the legislatively created remedy can
cure possible inadequacies of judicially created remedies. For example, the loss
to a person whose statutory rights have been violated or the gain to the violator
may be very small or hard to prove. Persons whose statutory rights have been
violated therefore may not have economic incentive via compensation or
restitution to enforce their rights. The legislatively created remedy guarantees at
least a minimal level of recovery for the right holder, thus encouraging
enforcement of the statute. Another common purpose of a legislative monetary
remedy is to deter statutory violations; judicially created remedies may be too
hard to prove or too insignificant to deter a particular person from violating the
Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551(f)(2)(A) (2006) (authorizing "actual
damages but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each
day of violation or $1,000, whichever is higher"); and 50 U.S.C. § 1810(a) (2006)
(authorizing "actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages of $1,000 or $100 per
day for each day of violation, whichever is greater" for violations of intelligence surveillance
rights).
105 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006). Other statutes that require the plaintiff to choose
between the legislatively created remedy and the judicial remedy include: 47 U.S.C.
§ 553(c)(3)(A) (2006) (providing that, for unauthorized reception of cable services, the
aggrieved party may recover actual damages and the violator's profits or "statutory
damages.., in a sum of not less than $250 or more than $10,000 as the court considers
just"); 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i) (2006) (providing, for unauthorized publication or use of
communications by wire or radio, that "at the election of the aggrieved party," the party may
recover actual damages and the violator's profits or "statutory damages ... not less than
$1,000 or more than $10,000, as the court considers just").
106 See, e.g., Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. § 305e(a)(2) (2006)
(authorizing treble damages, with "damages" defined to include defendant's gross profits);
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (specifying that an employer
shall be liable to the "employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or
their unpaid overtime compensation ... and in an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages"); id. § 260 (specifying that, if an employer acted in good faith, the "court may, in
its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof not to
exceed the amount specified in section 216 of this title").
107See, e.g., Satellite Home Viewer Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1 19(a)(6)(A)-(B) (Supp. IV
2011) (authorizing, in addition to other monetary remedies under sections 502 through 506
and 509 of the Copyright Act, statutory damages not to exceed $2,500,000 for each three-
month period during which a pattern or practice of violation was carried out).
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statute. Punishment may be another aim of a legislatively created remedy.
Because the availability of the judicially created remedy of punitive damages
usually depends on meeting a very high substantive law threshold, such as
conduct that is malicious or intentional,108 Congress may wish punishment to be
available at a lower threshold.
Beyond the possibility of a legislatively created remedy curing inadequacies
of judicially created remedies, the legislatively created remedy may serve a
different purpose altogether-to allow a remedy for violation of the right itself,
apart from compensatory, restitutionary, deterrent, or punitive purposes. The
plaintiff obtains at least a minimal level of recovery because of the intrinsic
value of the right itself. To illustrate, consider the hypothetical context of an
author of a highly acclaimed novel who repeatedly stated that she will never
create a work that is related to the novel and that she will seek to prevent
anyone else from publishing a related work.'0 9 A high school theater group later
writes and stages a play based on the novel without the prior knowledge of the
author or her publisher. The group did not charge admission to the play and thus
gained no profits. The author likely did not suffer "actual damages" under the
Copyright Act because she disclaimed using the novel for financial gain beyond
publication of the book itself."10 Any statutory damages award under the
Copyright Act in this hypothetical context might further deterrent and punitive
purposes, but more directly, the legislatively created remedy seems to protect
the intrinsic value of the statutory right itself."II
This notion of a remedy protecting the inherent value of the right itself
exists also in the common law. One example is protecting exclusive use to
property with a monetary award, even though the plaintiff had no intention of
using the property and no harm was done to the property. 112 Another example is
108 See generally JAMES M. FIsCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES § 202, at 923-26 (2d
ed. 2006) (discussing various threshold requirements that jurisdictions may employ with
respect to punitive damages).
109 This example is similar to J.D. Salinger's expressed intention not to create a work
related to his classic novel, The Catcher in the Rye, and his refusal to allow anyone else to
produce a work related to the novel. J.D. SALINGER, THE CATCHER IN THE RYE (1951). See
Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (granting preliminary
injunction in favor of Salinger against publication of defendant's novel and citing Plaintiff's
Memorandum of Law for court's assertion that "Salinger has not demonstrated any interest
in publishing a sequel or other derivative work" of The Catcher in the Rye), vacated, 607
F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
10 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 504(a)-(b) (2006).
111 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).
l12 See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 308 (2d ed. 1993) (stating the notion that
"certain deprivations in themselves really are 'damage' or harm.., recognized in property
torts when defendants are held liable for use of the plaintiffs money or property even
though no harm was done and even though the plaintiff himself would not have used the
property"); id. at 262 (discussing "[d]amages to [r]eflect [i]nherent [v]alue of [r]ights").
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that of presumed damages. 113 In suits involving invasions to dignitary interests
(such as reputation and privacy), or to civil rights (such as voting rights), courts
have allowed damages that redress loss of the right itself, even in the absence of
harm to the plaintiff or gain to the defendant resulting from the legal
violation. 14 These kinds of awards vindicate noneconomic, rather than
economic, rights." 15
2. Monetary Boundaries for Legislatively Created Remedies
When Congress creates a legislative monetary remedy, whether it is the sole
remedy for a cause of action, a remedy alternative to judicially created
remedies, or a remedy additional to judicially created remedies, the legislatively
created remedy almost always has monetary boundaries. 116 The creation of
boundaries for legislatively created remedies is justifiable because these
remedies are not limited to compensation or restitution. An award of
compensation or restitution intrinsically is bounded by how much the plaintiff
lost or the defendant gained, respectively. By contrast, with so many different
possible purposes, legislatively created remedies necessitate extrinsic monetary
boundaries.
Congress creates boundaries for legislative monetary remedies in one of
two ways-it either makes the remedy mathematically certain or it creates a
monetary range for the remedy. Mathematically certain remedies created by
113 Professor Dobbs has equated certain federal statutory damages awards to presumed
damages. Id. at 317 (citing statutory damages provisions under federal illegal wiretapping
and improper debt collection laws).
l 4 See generally id. at 248-355 (discussing presumed damages for invasion of civil
rights and dignitary interests); id. at 261 (stating that a purpose of presumed damages is "to
ascribe a value to the right in question irrespective of the plaintiff's actual harm beyond loss
of the right itself').
1]5Id. at 272.
116A rare exception occurs in the Lanham Act, which allows a plaintiff asserting
trademark infringement, under certain circumstances, to recover defendant's profits, any
damages sustained by the plaintiff, and the costs of the action. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117(a) (2006). With respect to recovery of defendant's profits, the Act has an unusual
provision granting the court very expansive power without an upper monetary limit: "If the
court shall find that the amount of the recovery based on profits is either inadequate or
excessive the court may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find
to be just, according to the circumstances of the case." Id. The Act further specifies that such
a sum "shall constitute compensation and not a penalty." Id. Another example of a statute
without an upper limit on a congressionally created monetary remedy is the Indian Arts and
Crafts Act, which authorizes, as an alternative to trebling the plaintiffs losses and
defendant's gross profits, an award of "not less than $1,000 for each day." 25 U.S.C.
§ 305e(a)(2)(B) (2006). Moreover, in the criminal context, the treason statute has no cap on
the amount of the fine that can be imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2006) (providing that
individuals who are convicted of treason against the United States "shall suffer death, or
shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined... not less $10,000").
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Congress are of two main types: remedies that are set at a sum certain 1 17 or
remedies that are a precise multiplier of other remedies. "18 With mathematically
certain legislatively created remedies, no discretion as to the amount of an
individual award exists. Once the court finds the defendant to have engaged in
the conduct prohibited by the statute, the amount of the award is determined as
a matter of law. Thus, review for excessiveness is not available unless the
statutory provision itself is attacked as unconstitutionally excessive.
With a monetary range for a legislatively created remedy, Congress vests
discretion in the trial decisionmaker (be it judge or jury) to determine the
appropriate amount on the facts of the case; questions of both nonconstitutional
and constitutional review thus may arise. The most obvious type of range for a
legislative monetary remedy is a combined floor (which can be zero or greater)
and cap for the remedy, such as in the Copyright Act.119 Another type of range
is a flexible multiplier, allowing a court to increase an underlying award "up to"
or "not more than" the multiplied amount. 120
117 For an example of sum certain legislative remedies, see 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2)(A)
(2006) (For illegal interception of wire or electronic communications, the plaintiff may
recover the greater of the sum of actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits
made by the violator or "statutory damages of whichever is the greater of $100 a day for
each day of violation or $10, 000." (emphasis added)).
118 An example of the multiplier remedy is double or treble "damages." See, e.g., Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (entitling employee to unpaid minimum
wages or unpaid overtime compensation and "an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages"). Congress has enacted statutes that have automatic treble damages provisions.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. IV 2011) (antitrust); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2006). In these multiplier statutes, "damages"
modified by "double" or "treble" typically means either compensation for plaintiffs losses
or some statutorily defined alternative such as the combination of plaintiffs damages and
defendant's profits. For example, the Indian Arts and Crafts Act authorizes "treble damages"
but expands "damages" beyond compensation for plaintiff losses to include defendants'
profits. 25 U.S.C. § 305e(b)(2) (defining "damages" for purpose of trebling as "includ[ing]
any and all gross profits accrued by the defendant" in violating the statute).
119 The floor can be zero, see, e.g., Satellite Home Viewer Act, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 11 9(a)(6)(A)-(B) (Supp. IV 2011) (authorizing, in addition to other monetary remedies
under sections 502 through 506 of the Copyright Act, statutory damages not to exceed
$2,500,000 for each three-month period during which a pattern or practice of violation was
carried out (emphasis added)); 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(B) (2006) ("In any case in which the
court finds that the violation was committed willfully and for purposes of commercial
advantage or private financial gain, the court in its discretion may increase the award of
damages, whether actual or statutory.., by an amount of not more than $50,000."
(emphasis added)), or the floor can be a .non-zero sum, such as with the Copyright Act, see
supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
120 See, e.g., Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006) (providing that "the court may
enter judgment ... for any sum above the amount found as actual damages, not exceeding
three times such amount"; the Lanham Act further specifies that "[s]uch sum ... shall
constitute compensation and not a penalty"); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 260
(2006) (stating that if employer acted in good faith, "court may, in its sound discretion,
award no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof not to exceed the amount
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A legislatively created remedy to be imposed within a statutory range
serves some purposes different from a mathematically certain remedy. An
award within a statutory range can be more sensitive to the circumstances of a
particular case than a mathematically certain remedy. Moreover, a degree of
uncertainty as to the amount of a remedy that will be imposed in a particular
case may serve useful deterrent purposes-it is more difficult for a potential
violator to calculate what the "price" will be to violate the statute.
In choosing a minimum and maximum amount of a legislatively created
remedy, Congress intrinsically makes a valuation of the statutory cause of
action. A non-zero minimum for a range means that the legislatively created
remedy is addressing something other than a right holder's losses or a right
violator's gains, because those losses or gains could be zero. Furthermore, when
the statutory violation is unintentional or innocent, a non-zero minimum may
have the purpose of redressing the value of the right itself because punishment
or deterrence is less relevant.
The minimum non-zero boundary that Congress creates for legislatively
created remedies can be quite small, such as the $100 minimum in statutory
damages under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act,121 and the
maximum boundary can be quite large, such as the $2.5 million in statutory
damages that can be added to other remedies under the Satellite Home Viewer
Act. 122 Even when the minimum statutory amount is low, high aggregate
awards are possible when the defendant has committed multiple violations of
the statute. The courts in Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum noted this possibility
under the Copyright Act, but other statutes admit this possibility as well, such as
when a defendant has sent hundreds of unsolicited faxes to a person in violation
of federal law 123 or when the defendant has affected an entire class in illegally
printing full credit card numbers on receipts. 124
Sometimes, Congress specifies meaningful factors in the statute to inform
the decisionmaker's selection of an award within the statutory boundaries. 25
specified in section 216 of this title"; section 216 provides for employee recovery of unpaid
minimum wages or unpaid overtime wages and "an additional amount as liquidated
damages," id. § 216 (emphasis added)); Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (providing that
"the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed"
(emphasis added)).
121 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (2006).
122 17 U.S.C. §§ 119(a)(6)(A)-(B) (authorizing, in addition to other monetary remedies
under sections 502 through 506 of the Copyright Act, statutory damages not to exceed
$2,500,000 for each three-month period during which a pattern or practice of violation was
carried out).
123 Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006).
124 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g) (2006).
125 See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2006) (requiring that a district
court, in setting class action awards of statutory damages, must consider, among other
relevant factors, "the amount of any actual damages awarded, the frequency and persistence
of failures of compliance by the creditor, the resources of the creditor, the number of persons
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Commonly, however, the statute does not provide any factors, 126 or, like the
Copyright Act, simply requires the court to award a "just" amount, a standard
that presumably is implicit in any statutory provision for a legislatively created
remedy.
Thus far, I have outlined questions pertaining to nonconstitutional and
constitutional review of the amount of congressionally created remedies, and I
have sketched the varieties of such remedies. Within the large category of
congressionally created monetary remedies, the focus for the remainder of the
article is on those remedies that are bounded by a range set by Congress.
III. NONCONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVELY CREATED
REMEDIES
Whether a reviewing court may review an award of a legislatively created
remedy for excessiveness on nonconstitutional grounds should depend on
whether Congress has specified factors to guide the trial decisionmaker's choice
of amount within the statutory range. Courts may review if an award is
reasonable in light of any statutory factors Congress has enacted, but courts
otherwise should not have the authority to review a trial decisionmaker's
decision as to amount. In developing this proposal, I will contrast the review of
legislatively created remedies to the review of judicially created remedies. This
proposal parallels nonconstitutional review that has been available in federal
sentencing, both in the past, when the selection of individual sentences within
statutory ranges was highly discretionary, and now, when the selection of
individual sentences is guided by statutory factors.
A. Whether Judicial Review of Amount Is Permissible
To the extent that Congress has not specified in the statute any factors that
should guide the amount of an award within the statutory range, courts should
not have the power to review for excessiveness because Congress has vested
complete discretion in the trial decisionmaker to choose an amount within the
statutory range. To the extent that Congress has specified statutory factors to
guide the choice of amount, excessiveness review should consider whether the
award is unreasonable in light of the statutory factors.
adversely affected, and the extent to which the creditor's failure of compliance was
intentional").
126 See, e.g., Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (providing that "the court may increase
the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed").
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1. No Statutory Factors to Inform Choice within Range
If a statute does not contain any factors to guide the trial decisionmaker's
choice of an award within the statutory range, the question becomes whether
any nonconstitutional limits on the decisionmaker's discretion exist. Put another
way, may a trial judge's or jury's choice of an amount within the statutory range
be set aside as excessive on nonconstitutional grounds? I will analyze this
question from three perspectives-congressional intent, the requirements of
procedural due process, and inherent judicial authority. My conclusion is that
reviewing courts do not have the power to deem an award within a statutory
range excessive on nonconstitutional grounds if Congress did not specify
factors to guide the initial choice of amount.
With respect to congressional intent, a strict textual argument could be that
a statute that lacks any criteria for choosing an amount within the applicable
range gives complete discretion to the decisionmaker within the range. Under
this statutory interpretation, a decisionmaker's choice of amount in an
individual case would not be subject to judicial review. Alternatively, rather
than vesting complete discretion in the decisionmaker, the statute could be
interpreted as merely silent on how to choose an amount. From this silence, one
might discern congressional intent in various ways.
One possible inference from silence is that Congress implicitly intended
that courts in individual cases would implement the underlying purposes of the
statute.127 This inference would allow courts to create factors to constrain the
initial choice of amount and to review that choice. A rebuttal to such an
inference is that Congress already rendered a judgment on amounts that fulfill
statutory purposes when it created the minimum and maximum of the range.
Thus, any amount within the range arguably fulfills the statutory purposes.
Another possible inference from silence on how to choose an amount within
the range is that the statute should be interpreted in light of background legal
principles. 128 One could argue that Congress legislated against a background
legal principle that monetary remedies awarded in particular cases should not be
excessive and that courts accordingly have the power to review for
excessiveness, even when the amount is within the range prescribed by
Congress. The problem with such an argument is that the Supreme Court in
1935 announced that congressional silence should not be read that way; rather,
1 2 7 Cf United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260-61 (2005) (stating that "a statute that
does not explicitly set forth a standard of review may nonetheless do so implicitly" and that
"[w]e infer appropriate review standards from related statutory language, the structure of the
statute, and the 'sound administration ofjustice"').
12 8 See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 298-303 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing role of common law in interpreting
statutory language); Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA.
L. REv. 485, 537 (2010) (noting "principle that statutes ordinarily should be read to
incorporate background legal principles").
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the Court said that no review for excessiveness is permissible if the amount
chosen was within a statutory range. 129
In the only Supreme Court decision to have opined on nonconstitutional
excessiveness review of legislatively created remedies, Douglas v.
Cunningham,130 the Court discussed an earlier version of the Copyright Act. At
the time, the Act allowed statutory damages between $250 and $5,000; then, as
now, the Act did not specify any factors to inform the decisionmaker's choice
of an amount within the applicable range.' 31 The trial court had awarded the
statutory maximum of $5,000, but the appellate court, concluding that the trial
court had abused its discretion, reduced the damages to $250.
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, stating:
[T]he employment of the statutory yardstick, within set limits, is committed
solely to the court which hears the case, and this fact takes the matter out of the
ordinary rule with respect to abuse of discretion. This construction is required
by the language and the purpose of the statute. 132
Thus, the Court held that abuse of discretion review was improper when the
trial judge had, as directed by the statute, chosen an amount within the statutory
range. Instead, the Court held that no review was permissible of the trial
decisionmaker's choice of amount. 133
Although the Douglas Court indicated that its no-review stance was
compelled by the language and the purpose of the Copyright Act, its reasoning
seemingly applies whenever the trial decisionmaker awards a legislatively
created remedy, unguided by any meaningful statutory factors, within the
monetary range that Congress specified. Congressional silence as to how to
choose or review the amount of a legislatively created remedy awarded within
the statutory range should be read against this background principle of no
review.
If Douglas instead is confined to its facts, one could argue that because
courts long have reviewed judicially created remedies in individual cases for
excessiveness, statutory silence means that Congress intended that courts should
likewise perform excessiveness review of legislatively created remedies. To
probe this argument, it is useful to sketch the review standards and procedures
for awards of judicially created remedies.
12 9 Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 210 (1935).
130 d. at 207.
131 I. at 210 (quoting statutory language then in effect).
132M.; see also F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 232
(1952) ("The necessary flexibility to do justice in the variety of situations which copyright
cases present can be achieved only by exercise of the wide judicial discretion within limited
amounts conferred by this statute.").13 3 See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.12
(1978) (citing Douglas v. Cunningham for the proposition that "assuming an affirmance on
the issue of liability, an award of statutory damages that is within the prescribed minimum
and maximum, may not be modified on appeal").
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The standard of review depends on who the initial decisionmaker is. With
respect to the jury as initial decisionmaker, the starting point is the Seventh
Amendment, which states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law. 134
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Amendment to guarantee an
entitlement to jury trial in actions brought in Article III courts seeking "legal"
(as opposed to "equitable") remedies. 135 The constitutional entitlement to jury
trial thus applies not only to common law causes of action, but also to statutory
causes of action for which the claimant seeks legal remedies.' 36
Courts may review jury awards of judicially created remedies for whether
the awards are inadequate or excessive in light of the evidence. 137 The Supreme
Court has used a variety of formulations to describe the nonconstitutional
excessiveness inquiry, such as whether the jury's award is "grossly"
excessive138 or "shocks the conscience."' 139 Despite the highly deferential terms
134 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
135 See, e.g., Chauffers, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558,
570-74 (1990) (holding that a demand for compensatory damages representing back pay and
benefits is a request for legal relief and thus confers an entitlement to jury trial under the
Seventh Amendment); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1974) (finding that
compensatory and punitive damages are legal remedies). "Legal" remedies include not only
compensatory and punitive damages, but also many forms of monetary restitution. See
Murphy, supra note 91, at 1598-1607 (documenting that monetary restitution typically is a
legal remedy, with important exceptions: when the money was obtained by abuse of a
fiduciary or confidential relationship, when the defendant is insolvent, and when the plaintiff
seeks to trace her property into another form or into the hands of a third person).
136 See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347-55 (1998)
(holding that "statutory damages" under the federal Copyright Act are a legal remedy and
thus a Seventh Amendment right to jury trial exists); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,
422-25 (1987) (holding that a civil penalty under the federal Clean Water Act is a legal
remedy and thus a Seventh Amendment right to jury trial exists).
137 See generally Colleen P. Murphy, Judicial Assessment of Legal Remedies, 94 Nw. U.
L. REv. 153, 188-90 (1999) (discussing historical and modem standards and techniques for
reviewing compensatory and punitive damages).
138 See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) (stating that under the Seventh
Amendment, judges may review jury awards to ensure that they are not "palpably and
grossly inadequate or excessive").
139 See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 422 (1996) (noting
that federal and state courts in New York previously "would not disturb an award unless the
amount was so exorbitant that it 'shocked the conscience of the court' (quoting Consorti v.
Armstrong World Indus., 72 F.3d 1003, 1012 (2d Cir. 1995))). If the cause of action in
federal court is based on state law, a more stringent review standard supplied by the state
legislature may apply. For example, a New York statute mandates judicial review for
whether a jury award "deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation."
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in these standards, modem review generally seems to have centered on whether
a jury award is reasonable in light of the facts. 140
When a trial judge, rather than a jury, initially assesses the amount of
compensatory damages or monetary restitution, the judge's finding is
considered a question of fact that is reviewable for excessiveness under the
"clearly erroneous" standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52.141 If a trial
judge initially assesses the amount of punitive damages, the appellate court's
nonconstitutional excessiveness review is for abuse of discretion. 142
As with the standards of review, the procedural consequences of a finding
of excessiveness depend on who the initial decisionmaker is. If a jury award is
deemed excessive, the trial judge may either order a new trial or, if the plaintiff
accepts a remittitur in lieu of a new trial, reduce the award to the maximum
amount a reasonable jury could have found. 143 If a judge's award is deemed
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney Supp. 2012). The Court in Gasperini held this statutory
review standard applied to a diversity case in federal court and characterized the statutory
standard as "tightening the range of tolerable awards" from the former "shock the
conscience" standard applicable in New York. 518 U.S. at 423-25.
140 See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 n.10 (1994) ("[T]here may
not be much practical difference between review that focuses on 'passion and prejudice,'
'gross excessiveness,' or whether the verdict was 'against the great weight of the evidence.'
All of these may be rough equivalents of... whether 'no rational trier of fact could have'
reached the same verdict." (citation omitted)); 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2807, at 82-84 (2d ed. 1995) ("The power [of review] exists in
the trial judge whether the verdict is unreasonably high or unreasonably low." (footnote
omitted)); id. at 79-86.
141 FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) ("Findings of fact [by the trial judge] ... must not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous."); see also 1 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS,
FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 2.22 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing appellate review of trial
judge's determination of damages).142 See, e.g., Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 923-24 (8th Cir. 2011) (asserting that
review of trial judge's assessment of punitive damages for excessiveness is under abuse of
discretion standard); Gaffney v. Riverboat Servs. of Ind., Inc., 451 F.3d 424, 464 n.39 (7th
Cir. 2006) (same); Ellis v. Gallatin Steel Co., 390 F.3d 461, 472 (6th Cir. 2004) (same); Fair
Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (same).1 4 3 See generally 12 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 59.13[2][g][iii][A] (Daniel R. Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012). The Supreme Court has
held that under the Seventh Amendment, a federal court may not reduce outright a jury's
award of compensatory damages; instead, the court must follow remittitur practice. Hetzel v.
Prince William Cnty., 523 U.S. 208, 211 (1998) (per curiam); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S.
22, 27-29 (1889). Lower federal courts are divided on whether judges may reduce jury
awards of punitive damages outright. See Murphy, supra note 72, at 468 (discussing cases
and arguing that the Seventh Amendment does not permit outright reduction of punitive
damages). An appellate court may review under the abuse of discretion standard the trial
judge's decision whether to order a new trial or remittitur. See, e.g., Cooper Indus. v.
Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433 (2001) (stating that "[i]f no constitutional
issue is raised," federal appellate review of the trial court's decision regarding a new trial or
remittitur is for abuse of discretion); Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 438 (stating that a district court's
review of a jury's determination of damages "would be subject to appellate review under the
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excessive, the appellate court will either modify the award itself or remand to
the district court for reconsideration. 44
Some courts have assumed that the standards and procedures for setting
aside a jury's award of a judicially created remedy apply equally to review of a
jury's award of a legislatively created remedy within a statutory range. The First
Circuit in Tenenbaum remanded to the district court to consider whether
"common law remittitur" was warranted; 145 the district judge in the Thomas-
Rasset nonconstitutional review decision invoked the common law "shock the
conscience" standard.' 46 By contrast, when trial judges initially have assessed
legislatively created remedies, appellate courts typically have applied more
lenient review standards to those remedies than to judicially created
remedies. 47
Legislatively created remedies are functionally distinguishable from
judicially created remedies, and thus it should not be assumed that Congress
intended that courts should review legislatively created remedies for
excessiveness. Judicially created monetary remedies have purposes that have
been defined and limited by the courts--compensatory damages for plaintiffs
losses, restitution for defendant's gains, and punitive damages to punish and
deter. These defined and limited purposes serve as benchmarks against which
individual awards can be meaningfully reviewed. A legislatively created
remedy that is statutorily guided only by minimum and maximum amounts may
have a variety of different purposes. Because there is no statutory benchmark
against which a particular award may be meaningfully reviewed, any finding of
excessiveness baldly substitutes the reviewing court's judgment on amount for
the initial decisionmaker's. Moreover, courts historically developed the review
standards for judicially created remedies in the absence of legislative monetary
boundaries, further undermining an argument that the background legal
principle of judicial review for judicially created remedies should apply to
legislatively created remedies.
I have argued that if a statute provides no guidance for how to assess the
amount of a legislatively created remedy within a statutory range, then the
statute should not be read to confer on courts the power to review, on
nonconstitutional grounds, particular awards for excessiveness. A potential
standard the Circuits now employ when inadequacy or excessiveness is asserted on appeal:
abuse of discretion").144 See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 141, § 2.22 at 2-146.
145 Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 490 (1st Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012).
146 The court cited as authority for this conclusion an appellate decision involving the
judicially created remedy of compensatory damages. Thomas-Rasset 11, 680 F. Supp. 2d
1045, 1050 (D. Minn. 2010) (citing Eich v. Bd. of Regents for Cent. Mo. State Univ., 350
F.3d 752, 763 (8th Cir. 2003)).
147See supra notes 129-33, 141-42, infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
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counterargument could be that procedural due process requires that awards of
legislatively created remedies be subject to judicial review for excessiveness. 148
The strongest precedent for this procedural due process argument is Honda
Motor Co. v. Oberg,149 in which the Supreme Court struck down an Oregon
constitutional provision that prohibited judicial review of the amount of
punitive damages awarded by a jury.150 The defendant had challenged the jury's
punitive damages award of $5 million as violating due process because the
award was excessive and because Oregon courts did not have the power to
correct excessive verdicts. The Supreme Court, while acknowledging that it had
previously recognized that due process imposes a substantive limit on the size
of punitive damages awards, limited its consideration in Oberg to the
procedural due process question, stating: "In the case before us today we are not
directly concerned with the character of the standard that will identify
unconstitutionally excessive awards; rather, we are confronted with the question
of what procedures are necessary to ensure that punitive damages are not
imposed in an arbitrary manner." 151 The Court asserted that judicial review of
the amount of jury awards of "damages," was "a well-established common-law
protection against arbitrary deprivations of property."152 The Court continued
that "[pjunitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of
property" because jury instructions often leave the jury with wide discretion in
choosing the amount and because juries may "use their verdicts to express
biases against big businesses.' ' 153 Oregon's provision violated due process
because Oregon had removed the common law safeguard of judicial review
against arbitrary jury awards "without providing any substitute procedure and
without any indication that the danger of arbitrary awards has in any way
subsided over time." 154
Because of the unique context of Oberg-a constitutional challenge to the
amount of a punitive damages award-the Oberg ruling should not be read to
apply to the very different context of a nonconstitutional challenge to the
amount of a legislatively created remedy. Although the Supreme Court wrote
148 In Part IV, I will discuss substantive due process requirements for reviewing whether
legislatively created remedies are unconstitutionally excessive.
149512 U.S. 415 (1994).
150 d. at 435.
151 Id. at 420.
1521d. at 430. The Court added that in the federal courts and the courts of all the states
except Oregon, "judges review the size of damages awards." Id. at 426.
153Id. at 432.
154 1d. In its conclusion, the majority stated:
The common-law practice, the procedures applied by every other State, the strong
presumption favoring judicial review that we have applied in other areas of the law, and
elementary considerations of justice all support the conclusion" that a decision to
punish a tortfeasor "should not be committed to the unreviewable discretion of a jury.
Id. at 435. Nowhere in the opinion did the majority cite support for its assertion of a "strong
presumption favoring judicial review that we have applied in other areas of the law."
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loosely of "damages" when it discussed the long tradition of judicial review of
jury awards, the cases it cited all involved compensatory and punitive
damages. 155 Thus, its ruling should not extend beyond those judicially created
remedies.
Even if legislatively created remedies are considered "damages" to which
common law protections presumptively apply, Oberg recognized that a
"substitute" protection against arbitrary deprivations of property would satisfy
due process. 156 The statutory maximum amount that Congress imposes on
legislatively created remedies serves the function of protecting against arbitrary
deprivations of property. Oberg confronted unlimited jury discretion in
assessing uncapped punitive damages; these concerns are not present when
Congress has created a monetary remedy that is capped. Congress presumably
chose the maximum amount in light of legislative purposes, indicating that its
choice was not arbitrary. Moreover, legislation by its nature typically covers a
wide range of potential actors, obviating the Oberg concern of individualized
bias against a disfavored defendant. Within the statutory confines, a trial
decisionmaker's choice of amount does not pose the threats of arbitrariness or
unchecked bias that troubled the Court in Oberg.
Although I have argued that procedural due process does not require
nonconstitutional review for excessiveness of a legislatively created remedy
awarded within a statutory range, a separate question is whether federal courts
have the inherent authority to review the trial decisionmaker's choice of
amount. A federal court's "inherent authority" is its authority to act without any
express authorization in the Constitution, a statute, or written court rule. 157 As
the Supreme Court has explained: "Courts invested with the judicial power of
the United States have certain inherent authority to protect their proceedings
155 Oberg, 512 U.S. at 422-26. The Supreme Court similarly used the term "damages"
loosely in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998). It noted
"overwhelming evidence that the consistent practice at common law was for juries to award
damages," by citing cases involving compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 353-54. It
then asserted that because juries awarded "damages" prior to the adoption of the Seventh
Amendment, the Amendment guaranteed a right to have a jury assess the amount of modem
copyright statutory damages. Id. at 348-55. I have previously criticized this reasoning and
the result. See Murphy, supra note 137, at 164-68.
156 0berg, 512 U.S. at 430-31 (noting that the Court previously had held that
"examination by a neutral magistrate provided criminal defendants with nearly the same
protection as the abrogated common-law grand jury procedure" but that Oregon had
"provided no similar substitute for the protection provided by judicial review of the amount
awarded by the jury in punitive damages").
157 See generally Kendall Coffey, Inherent Judicial Authority and the Expert
Disqualification Doctrine, 56 FLA. L. REv. 195, 197-200 (2004) (discussing Supreme Court
doctrine on inherent judicial authority); Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the
Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1805, 1805-06 (1995) (discussing nature of
inherent judicial authority). The Supreme Court has recognized inherent judicial authority to
sanction a variety of conduct, including bad faith violations of court orders, perpetration of
fraud on the court, and bad-faith misconduct by a litigant. See Coffey, supra, at 197-200.
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and judgments in the course of discharging their traditional responsibilities."']58
The Court has cautioned that the extent of inherent judicial authority "must be
delimited with care, for there is a danger of overreaching when one branch of
the Government, without benefit of cooperation or correction from the others,
undertakes to define its own authority."'1 59
Federal courts should have the inherent authority to review an individual
award of compensatory damages, punitive damages, or monetary restitution for
excessiveness, because courts historically created these remedies. 160 Such
inherent authority would explain why, when Congress creates a cause of action
and authorizes one or more of these judicially created remedies, courts may
review particular awards for excessiveness under judicially created standards.
Even if Congress has capped the amount of compensatory and punitive damages
in a particular cause of action, courts retain their authority to review awards at
or below the capped amount for excessiveness. 161
It is quite another thing, however, to ascribe to courts the inherent authority
to review awards of legislatively created remedies that have been limited by
Congress. If Congress created both a right and a corresponding monetary
remedy, and set the remedy at a sum certain, a court would not have the
inherent authority, on nonconstitutional grounds, to conclude that the amount of
the remedy in an individual case was unreasonably excessive. In this
circumstance, the court's only job, upon ascertaining that the defendant violated
the plaintiffs statutory right, is to enter judgment for the amount fixed by
Congress.
If it is true that courts have no inherent remedial authority when Congress
has specified a legislatively created remedy at a sum certain, then it arguably
follows that a court does not have the inherent authority to deem an individual
award excessive if Congress instead prescribed a range for the remedy. On the
other hand, one could argue that with a statutory sum certain, Congress has not
given remedial decisionmaking to the courts, while with a statutory range, the
courts must assess the remedy in individual cases. Perhaps inherent authority to
review for excessiveness flows from the individualized remedial decision that
vests in the courts. This conception of inherent judicial authority, however,
158 Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996).
159Id
160See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 507 (2008) (stating, in a
context in which the Supreme Court was exercising its common law powers with respect to
maritime punitive damages, "[t]raditionally, courts have accepted primary responsibility for
reviewing punitive damages and thus for their evolution, and if, in the absence of legislation,
judicially derived standards leave the door open to outlier punitive-damages awards, it is
hard to see how the judiciary can wash its hands of a problem it created"); id. at 508 n.21
("[T]he compensatory remedy sought in this case is itself entirely a judicial creation."); id
("Where there is a need for a new remedial maritime rule, past precedent argues for our
setting a judicially derived standard, subject of course to congressional revision.").
16 1 See generally Colleen P. Murphy, Statutory Caps and Judicial Review of Damages,
39 AKRoN L. REv. 1001, 1002-08 (2006) (discussing judicial review of compensatory or
punitive damages awards at or below the amount of statutory caps).
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seems to exemplify the "overreaching" that the Supreme Court has condemned
as inconsistent with inherent authority. 162
Congress has the authority to determine which kinds of remedies are
necessary for the causes of action that it creates. When a reviewing court deems
an award within a statutory range to be excessive, it implicitly rejects the
congressional judgment that the range is not excessive. Moreover, judicial
review for excessiveness can only be meaningfully accomplished if the court
creates factors to guide its review-factors that Congress decided not to
prescribe. Whatever the scope of inherent judicial authority over remedies in
individual cases, it should not include the power to reject Congress's judgments
concerning remedies that Congress has created.
In sum, when Congress has imposed a range for a legislatively created
remedy but has not specified factors to inform the choice of amount within the
range, there is no compelling case that Congress intended that courts review
individual awards of legislatively created remedies for excessiveness, that
procedural due process requires such judicial review, or that courts have the
inherent authority to engage in such review. I therefore suggest that courts
should not review a legislatively created remedy awarded within a statutory
range for excessiveness on nonconstitutional grounds when Congress has not
specified factors to inform the choice of amount within the range. Douglas was
rightly decided and should be followed by the lower federal courts, not just in
copyright cases but in any case in which Congress has remained silent on how
to choose an award within a statutory range. 163
Lower federal courts have varied as to whether, or how, they have reviewed
awards of legislatively created remedies for excessiveness on nonconstitutional
grounds. When confronted with a statute that does not prescribe any factors to
inform the choice of amount within the statutory range, some courts correctly
have implemented the absolutist language of Douglas, upholding the amount of
the award as long as it was in the statutory range. 164 Other courts have said that
their review is "even more deferential than abuse of discretion"'165 or
16 2 See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
163 In making this assertion, I do not deny that courts may create a list of non-exhaustive
and non-mandatory factors-informed by the statutory text and structure-that may be
considered by juries or trial judges in choosing an amount within the statutory range.
16 4 See, e.g., Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2001)
(upholding jury award of copyright statutory damages because it was within the statutory
range); Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 259 F.3d
1186, 1195 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant's motion for a new trial due to allegedly excessive jury verdict because the jury's
$31.68 million statutory damages award for copyright infringement was "well within the
statutory range"); SESAC, Inc. v. WPNT Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 531, 532 (W.D. Pa. 2003)
(stating, in copyright statutory damages case, "there is no good reason for the court to
interfere with the exercise of [the jury's] fact finding where there is no claim that the jury
was improperly instructed on the law").
16 5 See, e.g., Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 F.3d
488, 496 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Douglas for the proposition that "[o]ur review of such an
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"extremely narrow." 166 A few courts have even applied the abuse of discretion
standard, which Douglas rejected.167 Courts that do not follow the no-review
rule of Douglas have employed a variety of inquiries, examining whether the
trial record supported the amount, whether the trial judge explained how the
amount was determined, or whether the award complied with factors developed
by the reviewing court. 168
With respect to "statutory damages"-a term Congress often uses when it
creates a monetary remedy-the type of nonconstitutional review that courts
have employed makes little difference in result. Courts almost never have
deemed an award of statutory damages to have been excessive. A computerized
search of federal appellate decisions that reviewed awards of "statutory
damages"-when Congress had not specified factors to inform the selection of
an amount within the statutory range-produced only one case that concluded
the award was excessive. 169 In that case, the appellate court applied an abuse of
award is even more deferential than abuse of discretion"); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Star
Amusements, Inc., 44 F.3d 485, 487-89 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Douglas for the proposition
that "reviewing an award of statutory damages within the allowed range is even more
deferential than abuse of discretion," and that "[t]he district court had almost unfettered
discretion in setting its statutory damage award within the prescribed range").
166 Morley Music Co. v. Dick Stacey's Plaza Motel, Inc., 725 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1983)
(citing Douglas for the proposition that "[r]eview of a trial court's decision [on the amount
of statutory damages] is extremely narrow").
167 See, e.g., Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1309-10
(9th Cir. 1990) (finding trial judge abused his discretion in awarding almost $2 million in
statutory damages in class action).
168 See Digital Filing Sys., L.L.C., v. Aditya Int'l, 323 F. App'x 407, 420 (6th Cir. 2009)
(stating that "as flexible and as discretionary as the statute may be, some explanation [by the
trial court in choosing the amount of statutory damages] is required" and holding that,
because the district court on remand had explained its choice of amount, "the district judge's
decision must be upheld" (alteration in original)); Star Amusements, 44 F.3d at 488-89
(explaining that "concerns of due process and the opportunity for meaningful, if limited,
appellate review contemplate that the district court would provide some explanation of the
factual findings that underlie this exercise of discretion to award greater than minimum
statutory damages," and then finding that the district court had adequately explained its
decision) (internal quotation marks omitted); Six Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1309-10
(stating that "in determining whether a particular award serves [the Farm Labor Contractor
Registration Act's] deterrence and compensation objectives, the court should consider: I ) the
amount of award to each plaintiff, 2) the total award, 3) the nature and persistence of the
violations, 4) the extent of the defendant's culpability, 5) damage awards in similar cases, 6)
the substantive or technical nature of the violations, and 7) the circumstances of each case");
Morley Music, 725 F.2d at 3 (stating "there must.., be either some hearing or sufficient
affidavits to give the trial judge an adequate reference base for his judgment" in assessing
statutory damages and then holding that the record supported the district court's award).
169My research assistant initially found that Thomas-Rasset II was the only federal
decision to declare an award of statutory damages under the Copyright Act to be excessive
on nonconstitutional grounds. 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1053-55 (D. Minn. 2010). I then
constructed several computerized queries to find decisions reviewing the amount of
"statutory damages" awarded under other statutes. Several searches were performed at
2012]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
discretion standard to the district judge's award, adopted court-created factors to
guide its review, and seemed to have been heavily influenced by the class action
context of the award.' 70
With respect to trial judge review of a jury's award of "statutory damages,"
the Thomas-Rasset litigation apparently has produced the only reported decision
in which a court found a jury's award to have been excessive on
nonconstitutional grounds. As mentioned, the district judge applied the "shock
the conscience" standard-a standard developed in the context of reviewing
judicially created remedies for excessiveness. In selecting the standard of
review, the district judge did not reference the no-review approach of Douglas
nor any lower court decision discussing the proper review of legislatively
created remedies.
On its face, a common law review standard such as "shock the conscience"
or unreasonableness arguably is no more intrusive than the "even more
deferential than abuse of discretion" or "abuse of discretion" standards that
some lower courts have applied to awards of legislatively created remedies.
However, the results of such review standards clearly are different. With
common law review, judges often have set aside jury awards as excessive,
particularly when damages were not mathematically certain. 171 As I have
demonstrated, review of "statutory damages" under the no-review, "even more
http://www.lexis.com in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, Combined database. The queries were:
"(abuse pre/2 discretion) w/50 statutory damages and not copyright"; "statutory damages
w/50 excessive and not copyright"; "statutory damages w/50 remit! and not copyright";
"(abuse pre/2 discretion) w/50 (statutory damages w/50 Lanham)"; "(excessive or remit! or
reduce) w/50 (statutory damages w/50 Lanham)" (queries last performed Feb. 12, 2012 and
Feb. 13, 2012). Other searches were performed at http://www.lexis.com in the U.S. District
Courts, Combined database. Those searches were: "statutory damages w/50 remit! and not
copyright"; "(excessive or remit! or reduce) w/50 (statutory damages w/50 Lanham)";
"(excessive or remit! or reduc!) w/50 statutory damages and not Lanham or copyright"
(queries last performed Feb. 12, 2012 and Feb. 13, 2012). Beyond searching for "statutory
damages," I searched whether any federal appellate court decision had deemed an award of
"up to" treble damages to be excessive. I found none. This search was performed at
http://www.lexis.com in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, Combined database for "trebl! w/15
excessive" (query last performed June 30, 2012).
170 Six Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1309-10 (declaring excessive trial judge's award
of almost $2 million dollars in statutory damages in class action, based on individual awards
ranging from $100 to $500 for violations of the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act);
see also id. at 1309 (stating that "in determining whether a particular award serves FLCRA's
deterrence and compensation objectives, the court should consider: 1) the amount of award
to each plaintiff, 2) the total award, 3) the nature and persistence of the violations, 4) the
extent of the defendant's culpability, 5) damage awards in similar cases, 6) the substantive or
technical nature of the violations, and 7) the circumstances of each case").
171 See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Re-examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under
the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 744-45 (2003) (finding 168 federal cases
between 1991-2000 in which federal district courts granted a remittitur as an alternative to a
new trial and that 68% of those cases involved "damages not calculable according to any
formula").
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deferential than abuse of discretion," or abuse of discretion standards rarely has
resulted in a finding of excessiveness. The standard of review for excessiveness
that applies does indeed matter to outcome. Regardless of the review a court
applies to the amount of a legislatively created remedy, the jury's status under
the Seventh Amendment dictates that review should be at least as deferential to
a jury's award as to a trial judge's award. 172
The district judge's nonconstitutional review decision in Thomas-Rasset
shows what can go wrong when a court fails to appreciate the difference
between reviewing the amount of judicially created remedies and reviewing the
amount of bounded legislatively created remedies.' 73 In applying a review
standard that normally applies to judicially created remedies, the district judge
failed to show appropriate deference to the jury and to Congress. Although the
Copyright Act does not specify factors to guide the choice of an individual
award within the statutory range and does not require plaintiffs to prove their
actual damages, the district judge required that the amount of statutory damages
bear some relation to actual damages. 174 Although Congress chose a wide
monetary range for statutory damages in the Act-rather than enact an "up to"
multiplier provision as it has in other statutes-the district judge decided that
the maximum reasonable amount on the facts of the case was three times the
statutory minimum. 175 Although the jury chose amounts within the statutory
range, the judge deemed the jury's decision to be "monstrous" and
"shocking."'176 Admittedly, the second jury's $1.92 million aggregate award
against Thomas-Rasset for her illegal downloading and file sharing was large,
but because the award per song was within the statutory range, the aggregate
award should not have been set aside as excessive on nonconstitutional grounds.
172 See, e.g., Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 113 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating
that "we see no reason to apply a less deferential standard than the standard we use to review
calculations by a trial judge"). In making this argument, I do not exclude the possibility that
the judge could instruct the jury on a nonexhaustive, nonmandatory list of factors that may
be considered in making an award, with the judge gleaning those factors from the text and
structure of the statute. Cf Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 433 (1994) ("[P]roper
jury instruction, is a well-established and, of course, important check against excessive
awards.").173 See Thomas-Rasset I1, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1050-57 (D. Minn. 2010). Judge Zobel
in Tenenbaum also applied a common law review standard to the jury's award of statutory
damages, but she concluded that the jury's award was not excessive. See supra notes 81-86
and accompanying text. Thus, she reached the same result as would have been reached under
the "no review" approach articulated in Douglas and advocated in this Article when
Congress has not specified factors to guide the trial decisionmaker's choice of award within
the statutory range.
1 7 4 Thomas-Rasset 17, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1049.
17 5 Id. at 1056-57.
17 6 1d. at 1049.
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2. Statutory Factors to Inform Choice within Range
In a variety of statutes, Congress has chosen to specify factors that a court
must consider in choosing an amount within the statutory range. 177 When
enacting such factors, the intent of Congress is clear-the decisionmaker's
discretion is not unlimited within the statutory range. Rather, the statutory
factors are to constrain the decisionmaker's choice of an award. It then follows
that Congress must intend judicial review for excessiveness, to insure that a trial
decisionmaker does not violate the terms of the statute.
Regardless of who the initial trial decisionmaker is, the standard of
excessiveness review should be whether the award was unreasonable in light of
the statutory factors. If a trial judge is the initial decisionmaker on amount, the
trial judge must make findings of fact and conclusions of law.178 The appellate
court may thus review whether the trial court applied the statutory factors
properly and selected an amount tailored to those factors. 179 Courts sometimes
have labeled this type of review as "abuse of discretion," but essentially, it is
review for whether the decision on amount was reasonable. 180 If a jury is the
initial decisionmaker, the judge must instruct the jury on the statutory factors,
but the judge likely will not know whether the jury considered and applied those
factors unless the judge asks the jury to answer special questions. 181 Review
standards developed under the Seventh Amendment guarantee that the jury's
award may be set aside only if it is obviously unreasonable. 182
177 In a variety of statutes, Congress has specified factors that are to inform the choice of
award within the statutory range. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2006)
(allowing monetary recovery beyond actual damages in class actions in "such amount as the
court may allow, except that as to each member of the class no minimum recovery shall be
applicable, and the total recovery.., shall not be more than the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per
centum of the net worth of the creditor" and specifying that "the court shall consider, among
other relevant factors, the amount of any actual damages awarded, the frequency and
persistence of failures of compliance by the creditor, the resources of the creditor, the
number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the creditor's failure of
compliance was intentional"); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2006) ("In
determining the amount of a civil penalty [up to $25,000 per day per violation] the court
shall consider the seriousness of the violation or violations, the economic benefit (if any)
resulting from the violation, any history of such violations, any good-faith efforts to comply
with the applicable requirements, the economic impact of the penalty on the violator, and
such other matters as justice may require.").
178 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1).
179 An abuse of discretion standard encompasses review to insure that the trial court's
discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions. See, e.g., Koon v. United States,
518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (stating that "[t]he abuse-of-discretion standard includes review to
determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions").
180 For example, with respect to criminal sentencing under the Sentencing Guidelines,
the Supreme Court has equated appellate review for abuse of discretion with appellate
review for unreasonableness. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
181 FED. R. Cry. P. 49.
182 See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
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As with awards of "statutory damages" for which Congress did not specify
factors on how to choose within the monetary range, it is rare that a court will
deem excessive an award of "statutory damages" for which Congress has
specified such factors. A computerized search of federal appellate decisions
revealed only one case in which a court found an award to be excessive in light
of the factors that Congress had enacted. 183 The dearth of cases finding an
award excessive suggests that even with factors specified in a statute, reviewing
courts overwhelmingly defer to the initial decisionmaker's choice of amount
within the statutory range. In the single case that found an award excessiye, the
appellate court commented that only one of five factors specified by Congress
was present, and the facts suggested that even that factor was less important
than the others. 184 The appellate court then concluded that the trial judge's
award of statutory damages at half the statutory maximum was excessive.
185
This court's approach is consistent with the standard I advocate here-that an
appellate court may review whether the trial court applied the statutory factors
correctly and chose an amount reasonable in light of the factors.
B. The Criminal Sanction Analogy for Nonconstitutional Review
I have argued thus far that the possibility of nonconstitutional excessiveness
review of a legislatively created remedy depends on whether Congress has
specified factors relevant to choosing the amount in an individual case.
Analogizing to nonconstitutional review of federal sentencing decisions bolsters
my argument. Like Congress's creation of causes of action, Congress has
enacted an array of federal criminal offenses. For these criminal offenses,
Congress has created statutory ranges for the sanctions that may be imposed.1 86
Criminal sanctions have punitive and deterrent purposes; legislatively created
remedies often include these purposes. The question of the proper level of
review in individual cases is common in both settings due to the fact that
Congress has created both the offense/cause of action and defined the range of
the sanction/remedy. Thus, it is illuminating to trace how federal courts have
183 For the computerized searches I performed, see supra note 169.
184 postow v. OBA Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 627 F.2d 1370, 1384-85 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(reviewing statutory damages awarded by trial judge under Truth in Lending Act that
specified "[the court shall] consider, among other relevant factors" five enumerated factors).
185M. at 1385.
18 6 A possible objection to analogizing review of criminal sentencing to review of
legislatively created remedies is that historically, courts created common law crimes and
punishments and that legislatures only later defined 'criminal offenses and prescribed
statutory ranges. One could argue that this history resulted in a high degree of deference to
court sentences within statutory ranges. Without a similar history, legislatively created
remedies arguably are not analogous to criminal sanctions for purposes of discerning the
proper level of judicial review. I suggest that the analogy nonetheless is fitting. When
Congress defines a criminal offense and a minimum and maximum range of a sanction for
the offense, it acts similarly to when it creates a statutory right and a minimum and
maximum range of a monetary remedy for violation of the right.
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handled nonconstitutional review of the severity of criminal sanctions imposed
within statutory ranges.' 87 The approaches taken by courts in this context
parallel the proposal that I have made with respect to reviewing awards of
legislatively created remedies.
1. No Statutory Factors to Inform Choice within Range
Until the mid-1980s, Congress typically delegated the choice of sentences
within very broad statutory ranges to "the discretion of the court."1 88 Congress
did not specify factors that were to inform the trial judge's selection of an
individual sanction within the statutory range. The trial judge's choice of
sentence within the range was highly discretionary and appellate review of the
trial judge's choice was virtually nonexistent. 189 As the Supreme Court stated:
"We begin with the general proposition that once it is determined that a
sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute under which it is
imposed, appellate review is at an end."' 90 By contrast, in the context of
criminal contempt sanctions-sanctions historically created by courts-
appellate courts could review the trial judge's selection of a sanction under an
187 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has drawn parallels between the discretion involved
in criminal sentencing and the awarding of civil remedies, specifically punitive damages.
See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 505-07 (2008) (noting the "uncharted
discretion" inherent in "indeterminate" sentencing schemes and in the setting of punitive
damages and how federal and state sentencing moved to "guideline" systems).
18 8 See KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 13 (1998).
189 See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) ("Before the Guidelines system, a
federal criminal sentence within statutory limits was, for all practical purposes, not
reviewable on appeal."); see also Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and
Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.
1441, 1445-46 (1997) (discussing that in indeterminate sentencing schemes, trial judges had
enormous discretion to sentence within the statutory maximum and that there were few legal
principles against which a sentence could be reviewed); STITH & CABRANES, supra note 188,
at 9 ("For over two hundred years, there was virtually no appellate review of the federal trial
judge's exercise of sentencing discretion."). Appellate courts could, however, review for
clear factual error or unconstitutionality of the sentence. See Carissa B. Hessick & F.
Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008)
(stating that appellate courts could review for the possibility that the trial court based its
sentencing decision on "material misinformation . . . or upon constitutionally impermissible
considerations," such as race) (quoting United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1552 (2d Cir.
1989)); Reitz, supra, at 1443 (noting that prior to sentencing guidelines, the few appellate
decisions that existed dealt primarily with constitutional issues).
190 Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974). The Supreme Court did not
in Dorszynski explain the genesis of the rule against nonconstitutional review of a sentence
imposed within a statutory range. The cases that Dorszynski cited for the proposition also did
not offer an explanation. Some scholars have suggested that the rule was the result of an
assumption that Congress did not intend appellate review of criminal sentences when it
enacted an 1891 federal statute creating the circuit courts of appeals. See STITH &
CABRANES, supra note 188, at 197 n.3.
[Vol. 73:4
REVIEWING CONGRESSIONALLY CREA TED REMEDIES
abuse of discretion standard.19 1 The differing review standards for sentencing
within statutory ranges compared to sentencing for unbounded criminal
contempt are analogous to the differing review standards that I have advocated
for legislatively created remedies compared to judicially created remedies.
Given congressional boundaries for criminal sanctions with no other statutory
factors to inform the sentence in an individual case, appellate courts essentially
did not review the trial judge's choice of sanction. By contrast, as shown earlier,
some federal courts have been willing to review the amount of a legislatively
created remedy awarded within a statutory range when Congress did not specify
factors to inform the choice of amount in particular cases. It seems unjustifiable
that courts have pursued more intrusive review of highly discretionary
legislatively created remedies than was allowed for the review of highly
discretionary criminal sanctions.
The analogy to appellate review of an individual sentence translates easily
to the context of appellate review of a trial judge's award of a legislatively
created remedy within a statutory range. When the context is trial judge review
of a jury's award of a legislatively created remedy, however, one might argue
that the analogy is inapt. The trial judge, not the jury, determined the individual
sentence within a congressional range. Appellate court review was on a cold
paper record. By contrast, the trial judge who reviews a jury award has seen the
same evidence as the jury.
The criminal sanction analogy remains pertinent for two reasons. First, the
no-review stance that appellate courts took with respect to the severity of a
sentencing decision applied even when the defendant had pleaded guilty before
trial. In such a circumstance, the sentencing decision was largely made without
live testimony, making the "cold paper record" explanation for appellate
deference less apt. Second, due to the Seventh Amendment, deference to jury
decisions within a statutory range should be at least as deferential, if not more
so, than appellate court deference to trial judge decisions within a statutory
range.
2. Statutory Factors to Inform Choice within Range
With the federal Sentencing Reform Act, initially enacted in 1984,
Congress specified that a federal judge's sentencing within a statutory range is
to be informed by a variety of statutory factors, including: the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant; the advisory sentencing range under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines; the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the
offense and to afford adequate deterrence; the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities; the need to protect the public from further crimes of the
191 See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 188 (1958) (noting that "in the areas where
Congress has not seen fit to impose limitations on the sentencing power for contempts"
appellate courts have the power to review trial court's sentence for abuse of discretion).
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defendant; and the need to provide victim restitution.1 92 The Sentencing Reform
Act instructs courts to "impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with" the sentencing purposes set forth in the Act.193
The Supreme Court has since held that all federal sentences, whether within
or outside the applicable Guidelines range, are subject to appellate review under
an abuse of discretion standard for whether the sentence is reasonable.' 94 After
excising, for unconstitutionality, portions of the Sentencing Reform Act that
made sentencing within the Federal Guidelines mandatory, the Court reasoned
that the Act implicitly set forth the reasonableness standard of review. The
Court stated that this standard could be inferred from "statutory language, the
structure of the statute, and the sound administration ofjustice."'195
Apart from the Court's reasoning, I suggest that appellate review for the
reasonableness of a sentence is warranted because, unlike in the past, Congress
has specified factors that guide the trial judge's selection of a sentence within
the statutory range. So, too, should reasonableness review apply to legislatively
created remedies when Congress has specified statutory factors to inform the
selection of the remedy in an individual case.
I have argued that a reviewing court may declare a legislatively created
remedy to be excessive on nonconstitutional grounds only when the award is
unreasonable in light of any factors that Congress enacted to guide the selection
of amount within the statutory range. A reviewing court does not otherwise
have the power to review the amount for excessiveness. This approach to
nonconstitutional review might leave untouched a seemingly harsh award in a
particular case. Such a harsh award, however, would be the result of a trial
decisionmaker's compliance with the statutory scheme. Congress could respond
by revising the statute. Possibilities include lowering the maximum amount
allowed for a statutory violation, imposing an aggregate maximum when
defendants have committed multiple violations of the statute, or prescribing
statutory factors to guide the choice of amount within the statutory range.
192 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (titled "[flactors to be considered in imposing a
sentence").1931Id
194 See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (asserting that federal sentences are
subject to appellate review for "the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed
under an abuse-of-discretion standard"); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260-62
(2005) (concluding that the Sentencing Reform Act implied an appellate review standard of
unreasonableness after the Court excised, for unconstitutionality, portions of the Act that
made sentencing within the Federal Guidelines mandatory).
195 Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-61 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVELY CREATED REMEDIES
If a reviewing court deems an award of a congressionally created remedy
within an applicable statutory range to be unconstitutionally excessive, the
necessary corollary is that the reviewing court has deemed the act to be
unconstitutional as applied. The Supreme Court has asserted repeatedly that an
act of Congress is entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality. 196 Thus,
constitutional review for the possible excessiveness of a particular award must
give proper regard to the congressional judgment creating the monetary
boundaries of the legislative remedy.
Constitutional review should be guided by the Supreme Court's decision in
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Williams,197 which
indicated that a legislatively created monetary remedy violates due process only
if it is "wholly disproportioned" to the statutory offense.' 98 This standard is
similar to one that the Supreme Court has applied under the Excessive Fines
Clause to penalties payable to the government. 199 The deferential manner in
which federal courts have applied the Excessive Fines Clause is helpful
guidance for how federal courts should apply the Williams standard.200 By
contrast, Supreme Court doctrine on due process review of punitive damages
should not translate to legislatively created remedies, because the two types of
remedies differ in fundamental respects. 2O1 With respect to aggregated awards
of legislatively created remedies, I suggest that in rare circumstances, an
aggregated award may be unconstitutionally excessive even though the award
per statutory violation is not.
A. The Williams Standard and Its Application
The leading, and most recent, Supreme Court opinion addressing a due
process challenge to the amount of a legislatively created remedy is the
unanimous decision in Williams.2 02 A state statute allowed an intrastate railroad
196See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 28 (2005) (stating, in an as-applied
challenge to a federal statute, that the "congressional judgment" at issue was "entitled to a
strong presumption of validity"); United States v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32
(1963) (asserting, in an as-applied vagueness challenge to a federal statute, that there is a
"strong presumptive validity that attaches to an Act of Congress").
197251 U.S. 63 (1919).
198 1d. at 67; see also infra Part IV.A.
199 See infra Part IV.B.
2 00 See id.
201 See infra Part IV.C.
202 St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63 (1919). Prior to
Williams, the Supreme Court confronted constitutional challenges, principally under due
process or equal protection, to the amount of legislative awards or penalties, but, like
Williams, none of these cases found the amounts unconstitutional. See Standard Oil Co. v.
Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 285, 290 (1912) (upholding fine imposed pursuant to state statute
providing penalty between $5 and $100 against due process and equal protection
2012]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
passenger to collect a remedy of "not less than fifty dollars, nor more than three
hundred dollars" if the passenger had been charged a fare exceeding statutory
rates.20 3 The defendant railroad company overcharged the two plaintiffs by
sixty-six cents. The plaintiffs each won a judgment within the statutory range-
seventy-five dollars-plus the amount of the overcharge, costs, and an
attorney's fee of twenty-five dollars.204 The defendant appealed, asserting that
the statutory provision violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 205
The Supreme Court rejected the facial due process challenge.
Characterizing the statutory provision as "essentially penal, because primarily
intended to punish the carrier for taking more than the prescribed rate," the
Court reasoned that the legislature has wide latitude in determining amounts to
punish violations of the law.20 6 Although the Court referred in the opinion to the
statute as creating a "penalty," the statutory provision created a legislative
"remedy" as this Article uses the term, because private plaintiffs would recover
under the statute.207 The Williams Court rejected the argument that due process
required that the statutory remedy be proportioned to plaintiff harm. The Court
explained:
challenges); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111-12 (1909) (stating that "[w]e
can only interfere with such legislation and judicial action of the States enforcing it if the
fines imposed are so grossly excessive as to amount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law" and upholding statutory penalties assessed by jury at $1,500 and $50 a day
for violation of state antitrust laws); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78
(1907) (stating that "there are limits beyond which penalties may not go" but upholding state
statute against equal protection challenge that imposed a penalty of $50 for a common
carrier's failure to pay for property loss within prescribed time period; noting also that even
though penalty was large compared to value of the actual shipment, "it must be remembered
that small shipments are the ones which especially need the protection of penal statutes like
this"); Coffey v. Cnty. of Harlan, 204 U.S. 659, 665 (1907) (asserting that state statute
imposing penalty for double the amount embezzled did not "disclose[] any violation of a
right secured by the Constitution of the United States"); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115
U.S. 512, 522-23 (1885) (upholding against due process challenge a state statute that
allowed plaintiffs to recover double the amount of their damages sustained as a result of a
railroad's failure to maintain adequate fences of cattle-guards). The Supreme Court prior to
Williams did strike down under due process some rate statutes that imposed significant
penalties for charging in excess of statutory rates, but the rationale of the Court was that the
defendant did not have the procedural opportunity to challenge the legality of the rates
before overcharging. See Sw. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 419 (1915); Mo.
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340, 351 (1913). In upholding the statutory range in
Williams, the Court noted that the defendant did have the opportunity to challenge the rates.
251 U.S. at 64-65.
203 Williams, 251 U.S. at 64.
204 d. The opinion does not indicate whether the initial assessor of the penalty was a
judge or a jury.205 Id.
206Id. at 66.
20 7 Id. at 66-67; see also supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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[G]iving the penalty to the aggrieved passenger [does not] require that it be
confined or proportioned to his loss or damages; for, as it is imposed as a
punishment for the violation of a public law, the legislature may adjust its
amount to the public wrong rather than the private injury.20 8
Williams did not, however, insulate legislative judgments about remedy
from judicial review. The Court acknowledged that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment "places a limitation upon the power of the States to
prescribe penalties for violations of their laws." 20 9 The Court, however, adopted
a highly deferential review standard with respect to the constitutionality of a
monetary remedy enacted by the legislature: "[E]nactments transcend the
limitation only where the penalty prescribed is so severe and oppressive as to be
wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable." 2 10 In
rejecting the facial challenge to the statute, the Court considered the public
interest, the numerous opportunities for overcharging passengers, and the need
for uniform adherence to legislatively established passenger rates.2 11 These
considerations led the Court to conclude that the statute was not "wholly
disproportioned to the offense or obviously unreasonable." 212
Although Williams involved a facial challenge to a statute, it did not
preclude an as-applied challenge to an amount imposed in an individual case.2 13
Indeed, prior to Williams, the Supreme Court had previously entertained an as-
applied due process challenge to a civil penalty payable to the state that the jury
208Id.; see also id at 67 ("When the penalty is contrasted with the overcharge possible
in any instance it of course seems large, but, as we have said, its validity is not to be tested in
that way."). Judge Zobel in Tenenbaum I emphasized this element of Williams in upholding
the jury's award. She noted that Congress considered harms to the public from copyright
infringement when it increased the amounts of statutory damages available. Tenenbaum II,
No. 07-11446-RWZ, 2012 WL 3639053, slip op. at *5-6 (D. Mass. Aug. 23, 2012).
209 Williams, 251 U.S. at 66.
210Id. at 66-67.
211 Id. at 67.
212 Id.
213 The Supreme Court later cited Williams for the proposition that "[t]here is some
authority in our opinions for the view that the Due Process Clause places outer limits on the
size of a civil damages award made pursuant to a statutory scheme." Browning-Ferris Indus.
of Vt., Inc., v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 (1989). For cases involving as-
applied challenges under Williams, see, for example, Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama
Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 587-88 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that under Williams, "we
inquire whether the awards" violate due process and upholding district judge's award of
copyright statutory damages); United States v. Citrin, 972 F.2d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 1992)
(citing Williams and upholding award that resulted from automatic trebling statutorily
required under the National Health Service Corps Scholarship); Thomas-Rasset 111, 799 F.
Supp. 2d 999, 1004 (D. Minn. 2011) ("Under Williams, an award of statutory damages
satisfies due process [if it is not] ... wholly disproportioned to the offense or obviously
unreasonable.").
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imposed within a statutory range. 214 In that case, the Court rejected the
argument that the penalty imposed violated due process, employing a standard
equivalent to Williams, although with slightly different wording:
The fixing of ... penalties for unlawful acts against its laws is within the
police power of the State. We can only interfere with such legislation and
judicial action of the States enforcing it if the fines imposed are so grossly
excessive as to amount to a deprivation of property without due process of
law.2 15
Williams seemingly approved a very high ratio between the legislatively
created remedy and potential plaintiff harm. The Court upheld the statutory
maximum of $300, which would apply even if the overcharge was unintentional
and only in the amount of one cent.216 The Court deemed irrelevant the
potentially large ratio between the legislatively created remedy and the harm to
a plaintiff: "When the penalty is contrasted with the overcharge possible in any
instance it of course seems large, but, as we have said, its validity is not to be
tested in that way." 217
Between Williams and the district court's constitutional review opinion in
Thomas-Rasset,218 apparently no reported federal decision had upheld a facial
challenge to legislatively created remedies for excessiveness under due
process.2 19 Moreover, apparently no reported federal decision had found a
particular award of a legislatively created remedy to be excessive under the
Williams standard. The Eighth Circuit in Thomas-Rasset reasoned that the
214Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 100, 111-12 (1909) (upholding against
due process challenge a jury's assessment of $1,500 per day within statutory range of $200-
$5,000, and a fixed statutory amount of $50 per day, both payable to the state). Waters-
Pierce was decided under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the
defendant had not raised a challenge under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 11. It appears that the Supreme Court has since made the Excessive
Fines Clause applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. See infra note 230.
215 Waters-Pierce, 212 U.S. at 111 (emphasis added).
2 16 See Williams, 251 U.S. at 66-67.
2171d. at 67.
218 Thomas-Rasset 111, 799 F. Supp. 2d 999 (D. Minn. 2011).
219 For relatively recent federal cases rejecting facial challenges under the Williams
standard, see, for example, Harris v. Mexican Specialty Foods, Inc., 564 F.3d 1301, 1312-13
(11 th Cir. 2009) (holding that statutory damages range between $100 and $1000 under the
federal Fair Credit Report Act was not unconstitutionally excessive on its face); Green v.
Anthony Clark Int'l Ins. Brokers, Ltd., No. 09 C 1541, 2010 WL 431673, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 1, 2010) (holding that statutory damages range of $500 to $1,500 per fax under
Telephone Consumer Protection Act was not excessive under Williams); Follman v. Vill.
Squire, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 816, 821-22 (N.D. 111. 2007) (stating that maximum statutory
damages of $1,000 per violation of the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
would not be excessive under Williams); Arrez v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 522 F. Supp. 2d 997,
1008 (N.D. I11. 2007) (rejecting facial challenge to state statute allowing "up to $500"
penalty against employers).
[Vol. 73:4
REVIEWING CONGRESSIONALL Y CREATED REMEDIES
$222,000 aggregate award of statutory damages was consistent with Williams
because of the public interest in protecting copyrights, the numerous
opportunities for committing online copyright infringement, and the fact that the
$9,250 award per song was at the lower end of the statutory range.220 It also
cited Williams for the proposition that an award of statutory damages need not
be compared to the actual damages caused by the statutory violation. 221 In
upholding other awards of legislatively created remedies under Williams, courts
have asserted that maximum statutory amounts may be awarded even in the
absence of pecuniary loss 222 and that awards need not be proportional to any
actual loss.223 In applying Williams, courts have imposed or upheld very large
awards of "statutory damages." 224
When should a legislatively created remedy be considered to transgress the
Williams threshold of "wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously
unreasonable"? 225 Williams gave few clues to answering this due process
question. I suggest that guidance can be found in an analogous line of
doctrine-that determining when monetary penalties payable to the government
violate the Excessive Fines Clause.
220 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, Nos. 11-2820, 11-2858, 2012 WL 3930988,
at *8-10 (8th Cir. Sept. 11, 2012).
221Id. at *10.
222See, e.g., Follman, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 821-22 (stating that possible maximum
statutory damages of $1,000 for a single violation of the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act would not be excessive under Williams, even when plaintiff had not
suffered pecuniary loss); Arcilla v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., 488 F. Supp.
2d 965, 972 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (same).
223 See, e.g., Pasco v. Protus IP Solutions, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 825, 835 (D. Md. 2011)
(discussing facial challenge to the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act and citing
language from Williams for the proposition that statutory damages under "need not be
proportional to the cost associated with unsolicited faxes"); see also Zomba Enters., Inc. v.
Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 578, 588 (6th Cir. 2007) (upholding award of
copyright statutory damages and noting that Williams itself allowed an award that
represented a 113-to-i ratio of statutory penalty to actual harm).
2 2 4 8ee, e.g., Zomba Enters., 491 F.3d at 578, 588 (upholding $806,000 in statutory
damages for copyright infringement, with a 44 to 1 ratio of statutory damages to lost
licensing fees); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., No. C 07-03952
JW, 2010 WL 5598337, at *1, *12-14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010) (upholding jury's award of
more than $10 million in statutory damages for trademark and copyright infringement
against various defendants, including an individual); Facebook, Inc. v. Wallace, No. C 09-
798 JF (RS), 2009 WL 3617789, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2009) (imposing statutory
damages of over $700 million at $50 per violation for compromising accounts of Facebook
users in violation of the federal Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and
Marketing Act); Verizon Cal. Inc. v. OnlineNIC, Inc., No. C 08-2832 JF (RS), 2009 WL
2706393, at *6-7, *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2009) (imposing $33.15 million in statutory
damages at $50,000 per violation of the federal Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act).22 5 St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919).
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B. The Excessive Fines Clause Analogy
The Eighth Amendment provides that: "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 226
The Supreme Court has commented that "the primary focus of the [Excessive
Fines Clause] was the potential for governmental abuse of its 'prosecutorial'
power, not concern with the extent or purposes of civil damages." 227 In so
commenting, the Court observed that the Excessive Fines Clause is identical to
a provision in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.228 The English version was a
reaction to huge fines that were imposed on the king's opponents, with the
result that persons often languished in prison because of their inability to pay
the fines.22 9
With this historical understanding, the Supreme Court has held that the
Excessive Fines Clause constrains the amount of payments to the government
230
that are at least partially punitive; solely "remedial" payments to the
government are not covered by the Clause.231 The Excessive Fines Clause
covers payments that are either in cash or in kind, 232 and thus it applies not only
to traditional monetary fines or penalties but also to forfeiture of assets, as long
226 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
227 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 266
(1989); see also id. ("The Eighth Amendment clearly was adopted with the particular intent
of placing limits on the powers of the new Government.").
228 1d.
229 See id. at 267.
230 The Excessive Fines Clause apparently applies not only to the federal government,
but also to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S.
407, 419 (2008) ("The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment ... proscribes 'all excessive punishments, as well as cruel and unusual
punishments that may or may not be excessive."'); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool
Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433-34 (2001) ("[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment ... makes the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines and
cruel and unusual punishments applicable to the States."). But see McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 n.13 (2010) ("We never have decided whether... the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of excessive fines applies to the States through the Due Process
Clause.").
231 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 329 n.4 (1998) (noting that a
forfeiture that is "punitive in part" is "sufficient to bring the forfeiture within the purview of
the Excessive Fines Clause"); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993) ("We need
not exclude the possibility that a forfeiture serves remedial purposes to conclude that it is
subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause. We, however, must determine that it
can only be explained as serving in part to punish."). Lower federal courts reject challenges
under the Excessive Fines Clause if the payment to the Government is solely remedial. See,
e.g., Gupton v. Leavitt, 575 F. Supp. 2d 874, 882 (E.D. Tenn. 2008). If the government seeks
compensatory damages only, nonconstitutional review for excessiveness under common law
standards is available.
232Austin, 509 U.S. at 609-10 ("The Excessive Fines Clause limits the government's
power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, 'as punishment for some offense."'
(quoting Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 265)).
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as the monetary sanction or forfeiture is at least partially punitive. 233 The
Clause applies whether the payment to the government is considered a civil or
criminal sanction.234 The Clause does not extend to remedies or penalties that
private litigants, rather than the government, would recover. 235
The Supreme Court has only once found a violation of the Excessive Fines
Clause, in the 1998 decision United States v. Bajakajian.236 The context was
criminal forfeiture of assets, rather than a traditional statutory fine.237 In
Bajakajian, the federal government sought forfeiture of over $357,000 in
currency, which was the amount the defendant was seeking to transport out of
the United States.238 A federal statute requires that a person seeking to leave the
United States must report to authorities if he or she is transporting more than
$10,000 in currency. 239 Bajakajian pleaded guilty to violating that statute.240 A
separate forfeiture statute provided that a person convicted of willfully violating
the reporting statute (as well as many other statutory criminal offenses) shall
forfeit "any property. . . involved in such [an] offense." 241 This statute
mandated total forfeiture of any property involved in the offense; Congress
imposed no boundaries on the amount or value of the property to be forfeited.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that forfeiture of the
approximately $357,000, given the circumstances of the case, violated the
233 Id. at 609-10, 613-14, 618, 622 (holding that the Excessive Fines Clause applied to
civil in rem forfeiture because the forfeiture contained a punitive component); Alexander v.
United States, 509 U.S. 544, 558-59 (1993) (concluding that the Excessive Fines Clause
applies to criminal forfeitures because such forfeitures are "clearly a form of monetary
punishment no different, for Eighth Amendment purposes, rnom a traditional 'fine"'); see
also United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 281, 287 (1996) (finding that statutory civil
forfeiture provision constituted punishment under the Excessive Fines Clause but not under
the Double Jeopardy Clause).
234 See, e.g., Austin, 509 U.S. at 610, 618-22 (holding that the Excessive Fines Clause
applied to civil in rem forfeiture).
235See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 504-05 n.18 (2008) (stating
that the Excessive Fines Clause "does not constrain an award of money damages in a civil
suit when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a
share of the damages awarded" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court
specifically has held that the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to awards of punitive
damages to private parties. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 275. The Court left open in
Browning-Ferris whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to awards in qui tam suits, in
which a private plaintiff litigates in the government's interest and the private plaintiff and
the government share any recovery. Id. at 276 n.21. The Supreme Court also has not
addressed whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to punitive damages awards in which
the government would be entitled to a share of the punitive award. See Nancy J. King,
Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and Excessive Penalties, 144 U.
PA. L. REv. 101, 179-80 n.232 (1995).
236 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 339-40, 343-44.
237Id. at 321.
2 38 Id.
23931 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A) (2006).
24 0 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 321.
241 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (2006).
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Excessive Fines Clause. 242 The standard the majority announced in reaching its
holding was that "a punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it
is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense."2 43 The
majority explicitly drew this "grossly disproportional" standard from its
precedents under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause,244 but the
Bajakajian standard also echoes the "wholly disproportioned to the offense"
standard announced by the Williams court eight decades earlier. The Bajakajian
majority rejected a requirement of strict proportionality between the amount of
a punitive forfeiture and the gravity of the offense, asserting that "judgments
about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to
the legislature" and that "any judicial determination regarding the gravity of a
particular criminal offense will be inherently imprecise." 245
In considering whether the forfeiture was unconstitutionally excessive, the
Court first assessed the gravity of the defendant's offense. In so doing, the
Court considered the culpability of the defendant and the actual and potential
harm to the government and the public from the defendant's conduct.2 46 With
respect to the defendant's culpability, the Court found it "minimal" for three
reasons. 247 First, his crime was solely a reporting offense and unrelated to any
other illegal activity.248 Second, the defendant did "not fit into the class of
persons for whom the statute was principally designed: He is not a money
launderer, a drug trafficker, or a tax evader." 249 Third, the maximum penalties
applicable under the Sentencing Guidelines-six months imprisonment and a
fine of $5,000-"confirm[ed] a minimal level of culpability. '250 The Court
added that "[i]n considering an offense's gravity, the other penalties that the
Legislature has authorized are certainly relevant evidence," and it noted that
242 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 323, 337.
2 4 3 Id. at 334. The Court added that judicial review is de novo of whether a payment
would violate the Excessive Fines Clause, with factual findings made by the district court in
conducting the excessiveness inquiry accepted unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 336-37 &
n.10.
2 4 4 See id. at 336.24 5 Id.
2461d. at 336-39.
2471d. at 337-39.
24 8 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337-38. The majority also observed that under the
Sentencing Guidelines, the maximum sentence that could have been imposed on Bajakajian
for the reporting offense was six months imprisonment and a $5,000 fine, suggesting a
minimal level of culpability. Id. at 338-39. In a footnote, the majority acknowledged that
Congress had authorized a maximum fine of $250,000 and five years' imprisonment, and
that "this suggests that [Congress] did not view the reporting offense as a trivial one." Id. at
339 n. 14. However, the majority reasoned that because "the maximum fine and Guideline
sentence to which [defendant] was subject were but a fraction of the [statutory] penalties
authorized," the defendant's culpability was "small indeed" compared "to other potential
violators of the reporting provision." Id.
249Id. at 338.
250 d. at 338-39.
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Congress had "authorized a maximum fine of $250,000 plus five years'
imprisonment for willfully violating the statutory reporting requirement. 251
These statutory maximums, however, were less relevant to the Court than the
maximums under the Sentencing Guidelines, because the latter "show that the
[defendant's] culpability relative to other potential violators of the reporting
provision.., is small indeed. 252
After finding that the defendant's culpability was minimal, the Court
likewise characterized the harm that the defendant caused as minimal. 253 The
actual harm that resulted was "minor" because "[t]here was no fraud on the
United States, and ... no loss to the public fisc." 2 54 With respect to potential
harm if the offense had not been detected, the Court stated that the government
"would have been deprived only of the information that [the defendant's
money] had left the country." 255 Thus, the degree of culpability and the actual
and potential harm from the defendant's conduct indicated that the defendant's
offense was not very serious.
Having assessed the gravity of the defendant's offense, the Court then
determined that the amount of the forfeiture was grossly disproportional to his
offense.256 The Court's proportionality inquiry depended in part on comparing
the amount of the forfeiture to the amount of the other monetary sanction
imposed by the district court: the forfeiture amount was larger "by many orders
of magnitude" than the $5,000 criminal fine imposed for the reporting offense
violation.257 Although the Court did not explain the relevance of this
comparison, a possible justification is that the $5,000 criminal fine-the
maximum allowed under the Guidelines-was a mathematical measure of the
gravity of the offense, and the $357,144 forfeiture was grossly disproportionate
to that amount. The Court's proportionality inquiry also compared the amount
of the forfeiture to the harm caused by the defendant, with the Court concluding
that the forfeiture amount bore "no articulable correlation to any injury suffered
by the Government. 258
It is significant that Bajakajian involved not a fine within monetary
boundaries set by Congress, but rather a forfeiture of assets that happened to be
money. It was only in 1970 that Congress began to authorize criminal forfeiture,
and it did so initially to combat organized crime and major drug trafficking.259









2591d. at 332 n.7 ("It was only in 1970 that Congress resurrected the English common
law of punitive forfeiture to combat organized crime and major drug trafficking .... In
providing for this mode of punishment, which had long been unused in this country, the
Senate Judiciary Committee acknowledged that 'criminal forfeiture . . . represents an
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Criminal forfeiture differed drastically from other penalties Congress had
previously authorized in two ways: Congress imposed no boundaries on the
amount or value of assets to be forfeited, and Congress authorized forfeiture for
a dizzying array of criminal offenses that varied substantially in terms of their
seriousness.
Outside forfeiture of assets, apparently no reported decision of any federal
appellate court has invalidated, under the Excessive Fines Clause, the amount of
a penalty imposed within legislative boundaries. 260 In rejecting all challenges
under the Excessive Fines Clause to the amount of fines imposed within
legislative boundaries, the federal appellate courts have taken a variety of
approaches. Some have simply tracked the constitutional standard announced in
Bajakajian, asserting that the fine at issue was proportional to the gravity of the
defendant's offense.261 Some have expressed the view that if a monetary fine is
within the boundaries set by the legislature, the fine does not violate the
Excessive Fines Clause.262 To illustrate, the Seventh Circuit has stated: "[W]e
can't say the fine is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense when
Congress has made a judgment about the appropriate punishment. '263 The Fifth
Circuit has asserted: ."[N]o matter how excessive (in lay terms) an
innovative attempt to call on our common law heritage to meet an essentially modem
problem."' (citation omitted) (second omission in original)).
260A query for appellate court cases addressing whether a fine violated the Excessive
Fines Clause was constructed. WESTLAWNEXT, http://next.westlaw.com (select "Citing
References" for the Eighth Amendment; limit display to Courts of Appeals cases and search
within for "excessive fines") (query last performed July 23, 2011).
261 See, e.g., Moustakis v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 338 F. App'x 820, 821-22 (11 th Cir.
2009) (upholding $700,000 fine that was the accumulation of daily fines and stating "[r]ather
than being grossly disproportionate to the offense, the $700,000 fine is, literally, directly
proportionate to the offense"); United States v. Phillips, 327 F. App'x 855, 860 (1 1th Cir.
2009) (upholding fine "because there is no evidence that it was disproportionate" to the
defendant's offense); Noriega-Perez v. United States, 179 F.3d 1166, 1170 n.1 (9th Cir.
1999) (reasoning that the fine of $96,000 for possessing and counterfeiting over 300
fraudulent documents "is hardly 'grossly disproportional' to the gravity of' the defendant's
offense); Pharaon v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 135 F.3d 148, 148, 156-57
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to $37 million fine because "the
penalty is proportional to [the defendant's] violation[s]" of Bank Holding Company Act).
262See, e.g., Gonzalez v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric
Admin., 420 F. App'x 364, 370 (5th Cir. 2011) ("[N]o matter how excessive (in lay terms)
an administrative fine may appear, if the fine does not exceed the limits prescribed by the
statute authorizing it, the fine does not violate the Eighth Amendment." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Moustakis, 338 F. App'x at 821 ("The $150 per day fine that has accrued
for 14 years and now totals $700,000 is within the range of fines prescribed by the Florida
Legislature and accordingly is due our substantial deference."); Kelly v. U.S. EPA, 203 F.3d
519, 524 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[W]e can't say the fine is grossly disproportionate to the gravity
of the offense when Congress has made a judgment about the appropriate punishment.");
United States v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 750 F.2d 1183, 1193 (3d Cir. 1984) ("Although
[defendant's] one million dollar fine is substantial, its amount was the expression of the
Congress, not the judiciary.").
263 Kelly, 203 F.3d at 524.
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administrative fine may appear, if the fine does not exceed the limits prescribed
by the statute authorizing it, the fine does not violate the Eighth
Amendment."' 264 In suggesting that traditional fines imposed within monetary
limits set by Congress cannot violate the Excessive Fines Clause, these two
decisions seemingly confine the analysis in Bajakajian to asset forfeiture.
Other federal appellate courts have less starkly deferred to the legislature,
justifying their rejection of the Excessive Fines Clause challenge in part because
the award was well below the statutory limit 265 or a fraction of the statutory
limit.266 Beyond emphasizing that an individual fine was within the statutory
limits, appellate courts have also mentioned the proportionality of the fine to the
harm inflicted (explicitly considered in Bajakajian),267 the actual or potential
264 Gonzalez, 420 F. App'x at 370 (quoting Newell, 231 F.3d at 210).
265 See, e.g., Van Salisbury v. United States, 368 F. App'x 310, 312 (3d Cir. 2010)
(calling penalty "a substantial amount but well below the statutory maximum"); Qwest Corp.
v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 427 F.3d 1061, 1069 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding total penalty
in excess of $25 million and observing that the daily fines were "well within the statutory
limits"); Pharaon, 135 F.3d at 157 (upholding $37 million fine against individual as
proportional to his violations of Bank Holding Company Act and "well below the statutory
maximum").
266See, e.g., Korangy v. U.S. FDA, 498 F.3d 272, 277-78 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that
penalty represented "a substantial reduction of the penalty authorized by Congress"); United
States v. Gurley, 384 F.3d 316, 325 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that "only a fraction" of the
statutory maximum fine was ultimately levied); Newell, 231 F.3d at 210 (observing that fine
against defendant was only about 10% of the statutory maximum fine and "therefore, does
not violate the Eighth Amendment"); Kelly, 203 F.3d at 524 ("The inherently imprecise
decision to fine [the defendants] a total of $7,000 was not grossly disproportionate to the
violation of an important environmental safeguard that could have drawn a total fine of
$100,000."); United States v. Emerson, 107 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that fine was
one-half the size of that permitted by statute); cf Vasudeva v. United States, 214 F.3d 1155,
1161 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding civil monetary penalties against stores for trafficking in
food stamps against Eighth Amendment challenge because the penalties were in lieu of
permanent disqualification from the Food Stamp Program).
267 See, e.g., United States v. Blackwell, 459 F.3d 739, 771 (6th Cir. 2006) ("The fine in
this case is not disproportionate to the gravity of the offense inasmuch as it is equal to the
loss caused by the offense."); Qwest, 427 F.3d at 1069 (upholding penalty exceeding $25
million as "not excessive in light of the gravity of the harm caused by" the defendant's
violations of statutory filing requirements); San Huan New Materials High Tech, Inc. v. Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 161 F.3d 1347, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (upholding $1.55 million penalty as
"represent[ing] a relatively low ratio of penalty to value of infringing goods").
Several appellate courts have held that amounts imposed under criminal restitution
orders-orders requiring defendants to compensate victims for the victims' losses--do not
violate the Excessive Fines Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Newell, 658 F.3d 1, 35 (1st
Cir. 2011); United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v.
Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 342 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Dubose, 146 F.3d 1141, 1145
(9th Cir. 1998). In upholding amounts imposed under criminal restitution orders against
challenge under the Excessive Fines Clause, courts have cited the inherent proportionality of
the restitution order to the harm inflicted. See, e.g., Newell, 658 F.3d at 35 (upholding $1.6
million criminal restitution order and reasoning that "where the restitution order reflects the
amount of the victim's loss no constitutional violation has occurred"); id ("[R]estitution is
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financial gain to the defendant from the offense,268 the persistence or
multiplicity of the defendant's violations, 269 the need for deterrence, 270 and the
costs of investigating violations.271 The appellate courts are divided as to
whether the defendant's ability to pay is a factor under the Excessive Fines
Clause.272
inherently proportional, insofar as the point of restitution is to restore the victim to the status
quo ante. Restitution is distinct in this regard from forfeiture .... "); Dubose, 146 F.3d at
1145 ("Where the amount of restitution is geared directly to the amount of the victim's loss
caused by the defendant's illegal activity, proportionality is already built [in] ...." (quoting
United States v. Dean, 949 F. Supp. 782, 786 (D. Or. 1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted))).
268 See, e.g., Balice v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 203 F.3d 684, 699 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting
that fine was less than defendant's potential profit and concluding that fine was not grossly
disproportionate to the offense); United States v. Elkins, 885 F.2d 775, 789 (1 1th Cir. 1989)
(upholding $6.6 million fine against criminal defendant and stating that "[a]lthough a large
amount, we hold that a fine representing an amount less than the net profit of an illegal
transaction does not violate the Eighth Amendment absent a showing of severe,
particularized hardship suffered by defendant").
269See, e.g., Moustakis v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 338 F. App'x 820, 822 (lth Cir.
2009) (rejecting argument that cumulation of daily fines over 14 years, totaling $700,000,
violated Excessive Fines Clause); Korangy, 498 F.3d at 277-78 (upholding civil penalties of
$3,000 for each of 193 violations concerning mammography equipment and stating: "While
we recognize that this is a substantial penalty, the amount of the penalty is the direct result of
the number of individual offenses committed by [defendants].... [T]he gravity of their
offenses does not diminish because they repeatedly committed the same offense."); Gurley,
384 F.3d at 325 (commenting on defendant's "wilful noncompliance for a period of seven
years" in upholding civil penalties totaling approximately $2 million); Emerson, 107 F.3d at
80 (commenting on the defendant's "repeated, highly culpable conduct" as supporting a
significant penalty).
270 See, e.g., Towers v. City of Chicago, 173 F.3d 619, 626 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Five
hundred dollars is not a trifling sum. But the City, in fixing the amount, was entitled to take
into consideration that the ordinances must perform a deterrent function ...."); Cole v. U.S.
Dep't of Agric., 133 F.3d 803, 809 (1 1th Cir. 1998) ("The obvious purpose of the statutory
scheme, and in particular the penalty at issue, is to discourage introducing over-quota
tobacco into the market."); Emerson, 107 F.3d at 81 (approving district court's recognition
"that a substantial penalty would be important as a deterrent to potential violators, since
'aviation safety rests in large part on voluntary compliance by those who, in all probability,
will never face the regulatory scrutiny encountered by the defendants').
271 See, e.g., United States v. Zakharia, 418 F. App'x 414, 422 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting
that the government had "spent considerable time and effort investigating" the defendant's
misrepresentations); Noriega-Perez v. United States, 179 F.3d 1166, 1170 n. I (9th Cir. 1999)
("[A] fine of $96,000 ... is hardly 'grossly disproportional' to the gravity of [the] offense,
particularly considering [that the] cost of investigation was approximately $48,000.").
272 Compare United States v. Lippert, 148 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir. 1988) ("[I]n the case
of fines, as opposed to forfeitures, the defendant's ability to pay is a factor under the
Excessive Fines Clause."), with Balice, 203 F.3d at 690, 692 (concluding that statute did not
require consideration of defendant's ability to pay penalty and then denying Excessive Fines
Clause challenge to amount of penalty without mentioning ability to pay as a factor), and
United States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d 1304, 1311 & n.12 (1lth Cir. 1999)
(asserting that hardship to the defendant is not part of the Excessive Fines Clause inquiry
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Whatever the approach, the federal appellate courts have rejected all
Excessive Fines Clause challenges to civil and criminal fines imposed within
legislative boundaries, and they have upheld large, even multi-million dollar,
penalties. Of particular interest, in comparison to the jury awards in Thomas-
Rasset and Tenenbaum, is that appellate courts have upheld cumulative
$2 million and $700,000 fines against individuals for statutory violations that
neither led the defendants to profit appreciably nor caused direct economic
harm to others. 273
At the federal district court level, I found only four decisions directly
holding that the Excessive Fines Clause would prohibit the imposition, within
statutory boundaries, of the at-issue fines.274 The cases all involved aggregated
and that "excessiveness is determined in relation to the characteristics of the offense, not in
relation to the characteristics of the offender").
273 See, e.g., Moustakis, 338 F. App'x at 821-22 (upholding $700,000 in total daily civil
fines over fourteen years for homeowners' failure to correct housing code violations);
Gurley, 384 F.3d at 325 (upholding $2 million in total daily civil penalties over period of
seven years for defendant's willful failure to respond to EPA information requests).27 4 A computer query was constructed. LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexis.com (select "U.S.
District Courts, combined" database and search within for "Excessive Fines Clause") (query
last performed 7/17/2012). The four cases finding that the total aggregated amount of the
minimum statutory penalties would violate the Excessive Fines Clause are: United States ex
rel. Kurt Bunk v. Birkart Globistics GmbH & Co., No. l:02cvl 168 (AJT/TRJ), 2012 WL
488256, at *3, *11 (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 2012) (finding that aggregate civil penalties of over
$50 million--calculated at the minimum statutory penalty of $5,500 for each of 9136 false
claims--would be unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause); United States ex rel.
Stearns v. Lane, No. 2:08-cv-175, 2010 WL 3702538, at *4 (D. Vt. Sept. 15, 2010)
(concluding that a potential cumulative penalty of $66,000, for twelve false claims under a
federal housing program that resulted in an illegal gain of $828, was grossly disproportionate
to the defendant's offense and in violation of the Excessive Fines Clause); United States v.
Advance Tool Co., 902 F. Supp. 1011, 1018 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (finding that total penalty
exceeding $3 million for 686 false claims at statutory minimum of $5,000 per claim would
violate the Excessive Fines Clause, based in part on government's inability to prove actual
damages); United States ex rel. Smith v. Gilbert Realty Co., 840 F. Supp. 71, 74-75 (E.D.
Mich. 1993) (finding that total penalty of $255,000 for landlord's illegal endorsement of
fifty-one rent checks at $5,000 statutory minimum penalty per endorsement would violate
the Excessive Fines Clause). Another decision is ambiguous as to whether the court simply
exercised its discretion not to impose an additional remedy allowed under a federal statute or
whether the court believed that the additional remedy would violate the Excessive Fines
Clause on the facts of the case. United States v. Kruse, 101 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414 (E.D. Va.
2000) (noting Anti-Kickback statute mandates that the government recover double the
amount of kickbacks and allows an additional recovery of up to $10,000 per occurrence but
stating that "imposition of a $10,000 per occurrence penalty... would impose an
impermissible punishment in this instance"). A few district court decisions after Bajakajian
have not confronted Excessive Fines Challenges but nonetheless have commented that
potential penalties might be constitutionally excessive. See, e.g., Cohorst v. BRE Props.,
Inc., No. 3:10-CV-2666-JM-BGS, 2011 WL 7061923, at *14 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2011)
(regarding fairness of proposed class action settlement, special master speculating that a
potential award of state statutory damages in class action above the proposed settlement
amount "could present significant constitutional issues" but wrongly referring to Excessive
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mandatory minimum civil penalties for violations of the civil False Claims Act.
The Act requires a minimum penalty-currently $5,500-for each knowingly
false claim submitted to the United States.275 I will address constitutional
excessiveness issues pertaining to the aggregation of statutory monetary
remedies or penalties in more detail in section D.
The doctrine developed under the Excessive Fines Clause and the rarity of
excessiveness findings with respect to traditional monetary fines suggest two
conclusions. First, close judicial scrutiny of a penalty imposed in a particular
case is warranted when Congress authorized a severe penalty for many types of
offenses, with the offenses varying substantially in terms of seriousness. The
main problem in Bajakajian was that because Congress had required total
forfeiture of assets for a broad range of criminal offenses, the penalty was
disproportionate to the defendant's particular offense. 276 Second, the principal
reason that federal courts rarely have found traditional monetary fines excessive
under due process is a presumption that Congress created penalty ranges that
are proportional to the statutory offenses.277
Williams, under due process, and Bajakajian, under the Excessive Fines
Clause, share essentially the same standard of review for excessiveness-gross
disproportionality of the remedy or fine to the defendant's offense. Both
standards consider harm to the public from the defendant's conduct. The
legislature creates the remedies and penalties, including the monetary
Fines Clause given that no payment would be made to the government in the case); In re
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 462-63 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (in refusing to
allow state to rely on aggregate evidence, stating that "Mississippi's requests for [state]
statutory penalties on a per-violation basis, in addition to actual damages sought, would
result in a multibillion dollar cumulative penalty grossly disproportionate to both the injury
Mississippi has suffered and the seriousness of [defendant]'s alleged misconduct" and that
"[t]he scale of the potential recovery sought by Mississippi may implicate the constitutional
limitations on excessive fines and punitive damages"). Moreover, the federal government
has sometimes sought less than the statutory minimum penalties under the False Claims Act,
conceding that the total penalties would violate the Excessive Fines Clause. See, e.g., United
States v. Bickel, No. 02-3144, 2006 WL 1120439, at *3 (C.D. 111. Feb. 22, 2006) (noting that
United States conceded that where defendant had submitted 32,949 false claims, minimum
statutory penalty of $5,000 for each false claim would total $181,219,500 and thus be
excessive under the Excessive Fines Clause and concluding that $11,000 civil penalty
instead sought by United States plus treble damages did not violate the Excessive Fines
Clause).
27531 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1)-(3), (7) (2006).
276After Bajakajian, Congress amended the forfeiture statute to drop the currency
reporting offense and a few other offenses from the list of criminal offenses triggering total
forfeiture. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT), Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 371, 115 Stat. 272, 336 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5332 (2006)).
277 Cf King, supra note 235, at 153 ("If one looks at the typical penalty in isolation,
precluding constitutional review does not appear to be that unreasonable, especially because
a legislature and at least one representative of another branch (prosecutors, judges,
sentencing commissions, etc.) have already approved of its severity.").
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boundaries of both. Due to the unique concerns about abuse of government
power motivating the inclusion of the Excessive Fines Clause in the
Constitution, the level of judicial review under the Excessive Fines Clause
should constitute a ceiling for the level of scrutiny under due process that courts
should give awards of legislatively created remedies. Moreover, legislatively
created remedies awarded in a given case may or may not have a punitive
element; they should thus not be reviewed more strictly than punitive fines.
Courts reviewing legislatively created remedies for excessiveness under due
process should be as deferential to the legislature's and trial decisionmaker's
choice of amounts as courts have been in reviewing the amount of traditional
fines under the Excessive Fines Clause. Returning to the per-song awards of
$9,250, $80,000, and $62,500, respectively, in the three Thomas-Rasset trials,
and the per song award of $22,500 in Tenenbaum, I suggest that none of these
amounts are wholly disproportioned to the offenses committed by the
defendants. Several of the factors that federal courts have cited in upholding
legislatively created remedies and penalties against constitutional excessiveness
challenges are present with respect to the jury awards in Thomas-Rasset and
Tenenbaum. The awards were well within the relevant statutory range; there
was actual and potential harm, both to the plaintiffs and to the public generally,
from the defendant's illegal conduct; the defendants were within the class of
persons for whom the Copyright Act was designed;278 the plaintiffs incurred
costs in investigating violations of the Act; the defendants potentially could
have gained financially from their illegal conduct; and the defendants
committed multiple violations of the statute, indicating a higher degree of
culpability than a single violator.
C. The Inapt Analogy to Due Process Review of Punitive Damages
Some courts and commentators have suggested that Supreme Court doctrine
developed to review uncapped punitive damages awards for excessiveness
under due process should apply also to awards of congressionally created
monetary remedies, specifically "statutory damages. '279 This line of doctrine
should not apply to legislatively created remedies, because such remedies are
2 78 See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, Nos. 11-2820, 11-2858, 2012 WL
3930988, at *8 (8th Cir. Sept. 11, 2012) (stating that "the statute plainly encompasses
infringers who act without a profit motive" and that the legislative history of the Copyright
Act indicates that Congress intended the statute to apply to noncommercial infringers). One
might make the contrary argument that not-for-profit infringers do "not fit into the class of
persons for whom the statute was principally designed." Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 338. The
context for this language from Bajakajian, however, was a significant mismatch between
total asset forfeiture and the defendant's failure to report that he was taking more than
$10,000 in currency out of the country. Id. at 337-40. The Copyright Act is much narrower
in terms of liability and remedy than the criminal forfeiture statute involved in Bajakajian.
See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
279See cases cited infra note 311 and commentators cited supra note 18.
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limited by Congress and serve a variety of purposes beyond punishment and
deterrence. Even if the Supreme Court's punitive damages doctrine were to
apply to legislatively created remedies, courts should apply it with a very light
hand, following the lead of lower federal courts that have reviewed punitive
damages awards subject to legislative caps.
1. Whether Gore/Campbell Applies to Legislatively Created Remedies
The Supreme Court has held that due process places "substantive limits" on
the amount of punitive damages awards, 280 and that due process is offended by
a "grossly excessive" amount of punitive damages. 281 It has also commented
that persons should "receive fair notice ... of the severity of the penalty that a
State may impose." 282
Two principal cases developed standards for evaluating whether a punitive
damages award offends due process: BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore2 83
and State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company v. Campbell.284 These cases
developed three "guideposts" for reviewing whether a jury's punitive damages
award is grossly excessive: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct, (2) the ratio between the harm or potential harm suffered by the
plaintiff and the amount of the punitive damages award, and (3) the difference
between the amount of the award and the amount of penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable cases. 285 The Supreme Court has cited Bajakajian and
some of the Court's criminal sentencing decisions as precedents for the three
guideposts.286
2 80 E.g., State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-17 (2003)
("[T]here are procedural and substantive constitutional limitations on [punitive damages]
awards."); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433-34 (2001)
(stating that the Due Process Clause imposes "substantive limits" on punitive damages
awards in prohibiting government from "imposing 'grossly excessive' punishments on
tortfeasors").
281 See, e.g., Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416 ("The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments ...."
(citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S 559, 562 (1996))); Gore, 517 U.S. at 562
(stating that due process prohibits a "grossly excessive punishment on a tortfeasor") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
282 Gore, 517 U.S. at 574.
283 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
284 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
285Id. at 418 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575); Gore, 517 U.S. at 574-83. The Court has
asserted that the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct is the most important to the
excessiveness inquiry. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419; Gore, 517 U.S. at 575. Campbell
articulated factors relevant to determining the reprehensibility of a defendant's tortious
conduct, including: whether the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; whether
the defendant's conduct evinced an indifference to or reckless disregard of the health or
safety of others; whether the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident;
and whether the conduct was intentional. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419.
286 See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 435 (2001).
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Despite the similarities in assessing gross excessiveness, important
differences exist between the doctrine of Gore/Campbell and that of Williams
and Bajakajian. First, the harm to be considered in due process review of the
amount of punitive damages is only the harm to the plaintiff.287 By contrast, in
due process review of the amount of a legislatively created remedy, Williams
asserted that the harm to the public from the statutory violation was relevant,
beyond any possible harm to the plaintiff.288 Similarly, in reviewing whether a
legislatively created penalty violated the Excessive Fines Clause, Bajakajian
considered harm to both the government and the public from the defendant's
offense.289 As a logical matter, it would seem that an excessiveness inquiry that
considers harm to the public in addition to any harm to the plaintiff is more
lenient than an excessiveness inquiry that considers only harm to the plaintiff.
A second important difference between the doctrine of Gore/Campbell and
that of Williams and Bajakajian is the manner by which to measure any
disproportionality between an award or fine and the offense. With respect to the
guidepost that compares the amount of a punitive damages award to actual or
potential harm, Campbell suggested that "in practice, few awards exceeding a
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant
degree, will satisfy due process." 290 Williams and Bajakajian do not posit such a
mathematical approach. This is understandable, given that legislatively created
remedies and fines do not presuppose an award of compensatory damages or
even plaintiff harm.291 Recall that Judge Gertner in Tenenbaum suggested that
the difference in the approaches of Williams and Gore/Campbell "are, in
practice, minimal. '292 The "single-digit" ratio language of Campbell, however,
is in stark contrast to the implicit assumption in Williams that the difference
287 See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007) (stating that due
process does not allow a jury to base its punitive damages "award in part upon its desire to
punish the defendant for harming persons who are not before the court").
2 88 See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
289 See supra notes 246, 253-55 and accompanying text.
290538 U.S. at 425. It added that greater ratios might be warranted if a particularly
reprehensible act results in a small amount of economic damages, the harm might be hard to
detect, or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might be difficult to determine. Id.
(citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 582).
291 See supra Part JI.B. 1. Lower courts applying Williams have determined that the
statutory maximum of a legislatively created remedy may be imposed even if the plaintiff
has not suffered any loss; they also have asserted that a legislatively created remedy need not
be proportional to the plaintiff's losses. See Sheila B. Scheuerman, The Road Not Taken:
Would Application of the Excessive Fines Clause to Punitive Damages Have Made a
Difference?, 17 WIDENER L. REv. 949, 966-67 (2008) (noting the different approaches of
Bajakajian and Gore to comparing the amount of the penalty with the harm caused and
stating that "[b]y definition, damages cases provide an objective calculation of 'harm'
through the plaintiff's compensatory damages award. This concrete measure is lacking in
criminal cases").
292 Tenenbaum 1, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 101 (D. Mass. 2010).
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between a $300 legislatively created remedy and plaintiff economic loss of only
a cent would not violate due process.293
In addition to the differences in doctrinal formulation, the standards in
Williams and Bajakajian have produced dramatically different results in the
lower courts than the guideposts of Gore/Campbell. Review of uncapped
punitive damages under Gore/Campbell frequently has resulted in findings of
unconstitutional excessiveness. 294 A limited computerized search for lower
federal court decisions since June 22, 1998 (the date of the Bajakajian
decision)295 found eleven appellate court decisions296 and nine district court
decisions concluding that an award of punitive damages was excessive under
due process. 297 (Other federal courts have deemed awards of punitive damages
excessive on nonconstitutional grounds.) 298 By contrast, before the district
293 See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
294 The Supreme Court itself found the punitive damages awards in Gore and Campbell
to be unconstitutionally excessive. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429 (reversing punitive damages
award of $145 million for insurance company's bad faith refusal to settle); Gore, 517 U.S. at
585-86 (reversing punitive damages award of $2 million for fraudulent conduct).
295 A search was constructed. LEXIsNEXIs, http://www.lexis.com (select "U.S. District
Courts" & "U.S. Courts of Appeals," Segment-Overview, dates 6/22/1998-7/3/2012, and
search within for "punitive damage w/10 excessive") (query last performed July 16, 2012).
The results were reviewed to identify cases that deemed awards of punitive damages to be
excessive under due process.
296 Jones v. UPS, 674 F.3d 1187, 1192 (10th Cir. 2012); Thomas v. IStar Fin. Inc., 652
F.3d 141, 144 (2d Cir. 2011); Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 563 F.3d 357, 362 (8th Cir.
2009); Bennett v. Am. Med. Response, Inc., 226 F. App'x 725, 728-29 (9th Cir. 2007);
Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 436 F.3d 594, 608 (6th Cir. 2006); Bach v. First Union Nat'l Bank,
149 F. App'x 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2005); Bains v. Arco Prods., 405 F.3d 764, 777 (9th Cir.
2005); Boemer v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 394 F.3d 594, 603 (8th Cir. 2005);
Fabri v. United Tech. Int'l, 387 F.3d 109, 127 (2d Cir. 2004); Disorbo v. Hoy, 343 F.3d 172,
189 (2d Cir. 2003); Inter Med. Supplies, Ltd. v. EBI Med. Sys., 181 F.3d 446, 467-68 (3d
Cir. 1999). With the exception of Bennett, all the cases involved awards by a jury.
29 7 Quigley v. Winter, 584 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1162 (N.D. Iowa 2008); Eden Elec., Ltd. v.
Amana Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 958, 972-73 (N.D. Iowa 2003); Ceimo v. General Am. Life Ins.
Co., No. 2:00-CV-1386 FJM, 2003 WL 35481095, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 17, 2003); Stack v.
Jaffee, 306 F. Supp. 2d 137, 142 (D. Conn. 2003); EEOC v. Mid-Continent Sec. Agency,
Inc., No. 99 C 5381, 2001 WL 800089, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2001); Murray v. Solidarity
of Labor Org., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1155 (N.D. Iowa 2001); Ortiz-Valle v. NBA, 42 F.
Supp. 2d 334, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Ace v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 40 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1135-
36 (D. Alaska 1999); King v. Verdone, No. 97 CV 1487, 1999 WL 33432177, at *5 (D.
Conn. Sept. 30, 1999). With the exception of Murray, all the cases involved awards by a
jury.
29 8 See, e.g., Cretella v. Kuzminski, 640 F. Supp. 2d 741, 262-72 (E.D. Va. 2009);
Poliner v. Tex. Health Sys., 239 F.R.D. 468, 477-78 (N.D. Tex. 2006); David v. Caterpillar,
Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 918, 926 (C.D. I11. 2002); Int'l Minerals & Res. S.A. v. Am. Gen. Res.,
Inc., No. 87 Civ 3988 (HB), 2000 WL 97613, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2000); Williams v.
Patel, 104 F. Supp. 2d 984, 999-1000 (C.D. Ill. 2000). Courts may consider a punitive
damages award excessive under nonconstitutional standards even though the amount of the
award would not violate due process. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471,
513 (2008) (limiting punitive damage awards in maritime cases to an amount equal to the
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court's constitutional review decision in Thomas-Rasset, federal court review of
legislatively created remedies under Williams had not resulted in any
excessiveness findings.299 Federal court determinations since Bajakajian that
statutory fines were unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause have
been extremely rare.300
Litigants confronting awards of "statutory damages" have at times argued
that the awards should be reviewed for unconstitutional excessiveness under
Gore and Campbell.30 1 The context usually is that of a defendant who faces a
high aggregate award for multiple violations of a statutory provision, with each
violation subject to statutory damages. 302 Commentators, too, have asserted that
statutory damages should be subject to review under Gore/Campbell.303
Some federal courts, including the Eighth Circuit and the district court in
Thomas-Rasset, have explicitly rejected using Gore/Campbell to review
whether an award of legislatively created remedies violates due process.304
amount of compensatory damages as a matter of federal maritime common law rather than
due process); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 14.6(e) (5th ed. 2012) ("[C]ourts are free to interpret the common law of their jurisdiction
in a way that limits the award of punitive damages below the limit that would be set by due
process.").299 See supra notes 219-24 and accompanying text.
300 See supra notes 260-74 and accompanying text.
301 See, e.g., Pasco v. Protus IP Solutions, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 2d 825, 835 (D. Md. 2011)
("Protus makes the case that even if $500$1,500 in statutory damages [for violation of the
federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act] are constitutional, an aggregate award, taking
account of hundreds of unsolicited faxes, could easily reach into the millions, and could
therefore violate due process."); Arcilla v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., 488
F. Supp. 2d 965, 973 (C.D. Cal. 2007) ("Adidas does not contend a $1,000 fine would be
grossly excessive. Rather, it raises the specter of the tens of thousands of $1,000 fines that
could be imposed if the putative class is certified and eventually recovers the statutory
maximum.").
3 02 Pasco, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 835; Arcilla, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 973.
303 See supra note 18.
304 See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, Nos. 11-2820, 11-2858, 2012 WL
3930988, at *7 (8th Cir. Sept. 11, 2012); Zomba Enters. v. Panorama Records, 491 F.3d 574,
586-88 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1032 (2008) (refusing to apply Gore and
Campbell to copyright statutory damages and stating that the Williams standard controls
instead); Thomas-Rasset I1, 799 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1004-06 (D. Minn. 2011); Verizon Cal.
Inc., v. OnlineNIC, Inc., No. C 08-2832 JF (RS), 2009 WL 2706393, at *6-7, *8 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 25, 2009) (upholding $50,000 in statutory damages per violation of the federal
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act for a total of $33.15 million under the Williams
standard and discussing why Gore and Campbell should not apply to statutory damages
except perhaps for the rule from Campbell that "a court authorizing an award that reaches
well into [sic] realm of punitive or deterrence-oriented damages must be careful not to
punish the defendant for wrongful acts other than to those committed against the plaintiff");
Arrez v. Kelly Servs., 522 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1008 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (stating that Gore and
Campbell "are not relevant to statutory penalties" and upholding, under the Williams
standard, a state statute authorizing "up to $500 penalty"); Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg
Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 459-60 (D. Md. 2004) (concluding that Gore guideposts
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These courts have variously reasoned that Gore/Campbell is inapplicable
because it addressed open-ended punitive damages, not bounded legislatively
created remedies; 305 that examining the disparity between punitive damages and
plaintiff harm (the second Gore guidepost) does not translate well to statutory
damages, which often are available in the absence, or proof, of plaintiff
harm;306 and that the Court's due process concern about "fair notice" of
potential penalties is absent when a statutory range for the remedy exists-the
statute gives citizens notice of the maximum remedy to which they are
exposed.307
To elaborate on the distinction drawn by these lower courts between
punitive damages awards and legislatively created remedies imposed within
statutory boundaries, it is important to note that the Supreme Court's punitive
damages doctrine has focused on the risks of arbitrariness and uncertainty
attending awards of punitive damages; 30 8 the Court has sought to guard against
"punishments that reflect not an 'application of law,' but a 'decisionmaker's
caprice."' 30 9 The Court's cases all involved punitive damages awarded by
juries, who are one-time actors in the legal system, while awards of legislatively
created remedies fall within ranges created by Congress-a repeat actor in the
legal system who created both the statutory cause of action and the legislatively
created remedy. Congress enacts legislatively created remedies for relatively
discrete areas of substantive law and chooses the statutory minimum and
do not apply to copyright statutory damages); cf Arista Records L.L.C. v. Usenet.com, No.
07 Civ. 8822(HB), 2010 WL 3629587, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2010) (declining to decide
whether Gore and Campbell apply to copyright statutory damages because amount of
possible actual damages was greater than amount of statutory damages awarded).
305 Thomas-Rasset, 2012 WL 3930988, at *7 (emphasizing that copyright statutory
damages are "constrained by the authorizing statute"); Zomba, 491 F.3d at 586 (noting that
both Gore and Campbell addressed due process challenges to "punitive-damages awards"
and concluding that Williams controls until the Supreme Court applies Campbell to an award
of statutory damages); Arrez, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 1008 (citing cases distinguishing punitive
damages from statutory penalties); Lowry's Reports, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 460 ("The
unregulated and arbitrary use of judicial power that the Gore guideposts remedy is not
implicated in Congress'[s] carefully crafted and reasonably constrained [copyright
infringement] statute.").
306 See, e.g., Thomas-Rasset, 2012 WL 3930988, at *7 ("It makes no sense to consider
the disparity between 'actual harm' and an award of statutory damages when statutory
damages are designed precisely for instances where actual harm is difficult or impossible to
calculate."); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., No. C 07-03952 JW,
2010 WL 5598337, at *14 n.25 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010); Verizon, 2009 WL 2706393, at
*8.
307 See, e.g., Thomas-Rasset, 2012 WL 3930988, at *7 (stating that the "concern about
fair notice does not apply to statutory damages, because those damages are identified and
constrained by the authorizing statute"); Verizon, 2009 WL 2706393, at *8.308 See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 354 (2007) (summarizing
"the fundamental due process concerns to which our punitive damages cases refer-risks of
arbitrariness, uncertainty, and lack of notice").
3091d. at 352 (citing Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418).
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maximum accordingly. The trial decisionmaker has no discretion to make an
award in excess of the statutory limits. Thus, an individual award within the
statutory range is more appropriately viewed to be "an application of law"
rather than a "decisionmaker's caprice. ' 310 Moreover, the Supreme Court
developed the Gore/Campbell doctrine to address unambiguously punitive
remedies; a legislatively created remedy may or may not have a punitive
element.
Thus far, Judge Gertner in Tenenbaum apparently is the only federal judge
to have applied Gore/Campbell to an actual award of legislatively created
remedies, and she did so in the context of multiple awards of statutory damages.
A few other courts have speculated, without deciding, that Gore/Campbell may
apply to legislatively created remedies; the contexts likewise involved the
possibility of multiple awards. 311 Section D addresses separately whether
aggregated awards of legislatively created remedies pose unique constitutional
issues.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Gore/Campbell should apply to
legislatively created remedies, it is illuminating to consider how federal courts
have applied the doctrine to awards of punitive damages that were subject to
legislative caps. No commentator advocating the applicability of
Gore/Campbell to legislatively created remedies has pursued this line of
inquiry. As the next section shows, courts have weighed the existence of a
statutory cap favorably in their due process analysis.
2. Punitive Damages Subject to Legislative Caps
Congress only rarely has imposed a cap on judicially created remedies.312
The most frequently litigated example arises under the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
3 1
°Cf TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 455-56 (1993)
(responding to defendant's suggestion that "punitive damages awards should be scrutinized
more strictly than legislative penalties" under due process by stating "[t]he review of a jury's
award for arbitrariness and the review of legislation surely are significantly different[]").
311 See, e.g., DirectTV, Inc. v. Gonzales, No. Civ. A.SA-03-1170 SR., 2004 WL
1875046, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2004) (ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss and
stating as "hypothetical" the concern that "it may be that a statutory damages provision that
grossly exceeds any actual damages would violate due process" under Campbell); cf UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Lindor, No. CV-05-1095 (DGT), 2006 WL 335048, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 9, 2006) (allowing as nonfrivolous an amendment asserting affirmative defense that
copyright statutory damages minimum of $750 would be unconstitutionally excessive
compared to actual damages of 70 cents per recording).
312Thus far, no federal statute has capped compensatory or punitive damages in pre-
existing common law actions, although bills have been introduced in Congress that would
cap plaintiffs' recovery of damages in actions for medical malpractice and products liability.
See, e.g., Protecting Access to Healthcare Act, H.R. 5, 112th Cong. (2012) (as passed by
House, Mar. 22, 2012); Meaningful End to Defensive Medicine & Aimless Lawsuits
(MedMal) Act of 2010, H.R. 5690, 111 th Cong. (2010); Fair Resolution of Medical Liability
Disputes Act of 2009, S. 2662, 111th Cong. (2009); Innocent Sellers Fairness Act,
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which has a sliding scale of caps on the total amount of compensatory and
punitive damages recoverable for employment discrimination claims arising
under federal law.3 13 The Act expressly exempts back pay and past pecuniary
losses from the caps. 3 14 The caps are gauged to the number of employees
working for the employer, with a $300,000 upper limit.3 15
Many federal courts addressing whether a punitive damages award subject
to one of these caps was unconstitutionally excessive have assumed that
Gore/Campbell governs. 316 If the initial punitive damages award was above the
statutory cap, courts usually have treated the award as reduced to the statutory
maximum and then applied the Gore guideposts.317 Several courts have asserted
that the existence of the statutory cap is a strong factor in favor of finding that
the award does not violate due process. Some have reasoned that the existence
H.R. 2518, 11 th Cong. (2009). With respect to causes of action created by Congress in
which a constitutional right to jury trial exists, very few federal statutes cap judicial
remedies. See, e.g., Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761; Civil Rights Act of
1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (discussed in infra notes 313-15 and accompanying text). See
generally Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation: The Tension Between Legislative
Power and Jury Authority, 74 TEX. L. REV. 345, 373-77 (1995) (discussing federal statutes
that limit compensatory damages, including for causes of action in which no entitlement to
jury trial exists).
313 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(b)(3)(A)-(D) (2006). Most of the legislative debate on capping
damages in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 focused on punitive damages; many legislators
feared that juries would assess large punitive damages, crippling small businesses. Murphy,
supra note 312, at 375; see also 137 CONG. REC. S15472 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement
of Sen. Dole) (claiming that the caps set "an important precedent for tort reform"); 136
CONG. REc. S9909 (daily ed. July 18, 1990) (statement of Sen. Bumpers) (warning that the
threat of punitive damages would be "a Damocles sword" over the heads of small
businesses). The legislative history does not reveal why Congress decided to limit
compensatory awards also.
314 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2) (2006).
3 151Id. § 1981a(b)(3)(D).
3 16 See, e.g., EEOC v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 614 (11th Cir. 2000); Allen v. Radio
One of Tex. II, L.L.C., No. H-09-4088, 2011 WL 5156688 at, *4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2011)
(applying reprehensibility guidepost under Gore to a punitive damages award reduced to the
Title VII cap and upholding award); Myers v. Cent. Fla. Inv., Inc., No. 6:04-cv-1542-Orl-
28DAB, 2008 WL 4710898, at *16 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 2008) (applying Gore guideposts to a
punitive award reduced to a state cap and upholding award); Lopez v. Aramark Unif. &
Career Apparel, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 2d 914, 968-72 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (applying Gore
guideposts to a punitive damages award that was less than Title VII statutory cap and
upholding award); Millazzo v. Universal Traffic Serv., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1255-58
(D. Colo. 2003) (applying Gore guideposts to punitive award reduced to Title VII cap and
upholding award).3 17 But see Arizona v. ASARCO, L.L.C., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1046 (D. Ariz. 2011)
(stating in a case where a Title VII cap applied: "[R]ather than applying an unconstitutional
excessiveness analysis to a 'capped' punitive damages award, I believe that the proper
approach is to consider the jury's punitive damages award in light of the factors pertinent to
an unconstitutional excessiveness analysis. Then, if due process would otherwise permit a
larger award, I must reduce the punitive damages award to the amount that, combined with
any compensatory damages, conforms to the applicable statutory cap.").
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of the statutory cap satisfies the underlying Gore/Campbell concern that a
person have fair notice of the severity of the penalty to which the person may be
subjected.318 Others have assumed that the existence of a statutory cap satisfies
the third Gore/Campbell guidepost comparing a punitive damages award to
penalties authorized or imposed in other cases-the cap is the "comparator" for
purposes of the third guidepost.319
Although many federal courts assume that Gore/Campbell applies, at least
two federal courts of appeals have intimated that the employment
discrimination caps largely obviate the need for Gore/Campbell review because
of the deference due to Congress's choice of the cap amounts. 320 The First
Circuit asserted that "a punitive damages award that comports with a statutory
cap provides strong evidence that a defendant's due process rights have not
318See, e.g., EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., 513 F.3d 360, 378 (4th Cir. 2008). The
Fourth Circuit, after applying the Gore guideposts, stated that the fact that the punitive
damages award, combined with the compensatory damages award, was substantially less
than the applicable Title VII cap "provides additional support for the reasonableness and
constitutionality of the punitive damages award." Id. The court further reasoned that the
statutory cap gave the defendant "fair notice of the range of available civil penalties" for
discriminatory conduct. Id.3 19 See, e.g., Romano v. U-Haul Int'l, 233 F.3d 655, 674 (1st Cir. 2000) (addressing
third guidepost and stating that "through the statutory scheme of Title VII and the punitive
damages cap figures set out ... [a defendant] has full notice of the potential liability to
which it was subject"); W&O, 213 F.3d at 617 (stating that statute put defendant "on notice
that it could be liable for punitive damages up to the statutory cap" in discussing the third
guidepost and upholding punitive damages award); ASARCO, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 ("[I]t
is appropriate to use Title VII's statutory cap as a yardstick of constitutional excessiveness,
because the Title VII cap 'represent[s] a legislative judgment similar to the imposition of a
civil fine"' (citing Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, 339 F.3d 1020, 1045 (9th Cir. 2003))).
320 See, e.g., Abner v. Kansas City S. R.R. Co., 513 F.3d 154, 164 (5th Cir. 2008)
("[T]he combination of the statutory cap and high threshold of culpability for any award
confines the amount of the award to a level tolerated by due process. Given that Congress
has effectively set the tolerable proportion, the three-factor Gore analysis is relevant only if
the statutory cap itself offends due process."); Romano, 233 F.3d at 673 (stating that "a
congressionally-mandated, statutory scheme identifying the prohibited conduct as well as the
potential range of financial penalties goes far in assuring that [defendants'] due process
rights have not been violated" and then adding that "even subjecting the $285,000 award to
the Gore three-guidepost analysis, we find that the amount is constitutionally permissible").
The First Circuit in Romano justified its assertion that "a punitive damages award that
comports with a statutory cap provides strong evidence that a defendant's due process rights
have not been violated" based on language in Gore that "a reviewing court engaged in
determining whether an award of punitive damages is excessive should accord substantial
deference to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions." 233 F.3d at 673
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also ASARCO, 798 F. Supp. 2d 1023 at 1044
(interpreting decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as suggesting that "in a
Title VII discrimination case, a punitive damages award at the statutory cap ... would
comport with due process, if it is otherwise supported by evidence that punitive damages
were warranted"). But cf Johnson v. Hugo's Skateway, 974 F.2d 1408, 1415 n.6 (4th Cir.
1992) ("We cannot say ... that the mere existence of the cap will... insulate from attack an
otherwise arbitrary award of punitive damages.").
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been violated."'321 It based this assertion on language in Gore that "a reviewing
court engaged in determining whether an award of punitive damages is
excessive should accord substantial deference to legislative judgments
concerning appropriate sanctions." 322 The Fifth Circuit has gone even further in
insulating a punitive damages award at or below a statutory cap from analysis
under Gore/Campbell:
[T]he combination of the statutory cap and high threshold of culpability for any
award confines the amount of the award to a level tolerated by due process.
Given that Congress has effectively set the tolerable proportion, the three-
factor Gore analysis is relevant only if the statutory cap itself offends due
process.323
Whether the federal courts straightforwardly applied the Gore guideposts,
considered the existence of the statutory cap as an important factor in applying
the Gore guideposts, or took the bolder position that the statutory cap for the
most part supplants Gore/Campbell review, the result has been the same: courts
have been reluctant to find that a punitive damages award at or below a federal
statutory cap violated due process.324 Instead, federal courts have upheld
32 1 Romano, 233 F.3d at 673.
322 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583 (1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
323 Abner, 513 F.3d at 164. The Abner court conclusorily asserted that the Title VII cap
did not offend due process. Id. Earlier decisions of the Fifth Circuit, however, declared
punitive damages awards under Title VII to be excessive under nonconstitutional review,
informed by the Gore guideposts. See Rubinstein v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d
392, 407 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that "a more fully developed approach to assessing the
Constitutionality of a punitive damages award awaits a future day"); Deffenbaugh-Williams
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 595 (5th Cir. 1998) (characterizing Gore as
"'instructive"' in evaluating defendant's non-constitutional excessiveness challenge and
stating that it "will not develop in detail the three [guideposts] as will be necessary for a
constitutional challenge").
3241 constructed a query for federal court cases discussing whether a punitive award at
or below a statutory cap violated due process. LEXisNEXis, http://www.lexis.com (select
"Federal Court Cases" and search within for "(statutory pre/1 cap) w/50 due process")
(query last performed Jan. 24, 2012). I found only one case in which a federal court seemed
to hold that a punitive damages award under a statutory cap violated due process under the
Gore guideposts. See Geuss v. Pfizer, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 164, 178 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (applying
Gore guideposts in concluding punitive damages award under Americans with Disability
Act cap was excessive and using the nonconstitutional review language that the jury's award
"shock[ed] the court's conscience"); cf Austin v. Norfolk S. Corp., 158 F. App'x 374, 390
(3d Cir. 2005) (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (arguing, contrary to majority opinion, that plaintiff
prevailed on her retaliation claim under Title VII, and then asserting that the $175,000
punitive award at the trial level, subject to a $300,000 cap, violated due process under the
Gore guideposts); ASARCO, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1046 ("[D]ue process might well limit a
punitive damages award to an amount well below an applicable statutory cap. For example,
if a plaintiff suffered $2,500 in compensatory damages from a single incident, involving
conduct that was more accidental than malicious, due process might well limit that plaintiff's
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substantial punitive damages awards subject to a statutory cap, even when the
plaintiff's actual or potential harm was nominal or comparatively low.325 Courts
upholding high punitive to compensatory ratios have relied in part on Supreme
Court language in Gore:
[L]ow awards of compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio
than high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly egregious act
has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages. A higher ratio may
also be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect or the monetary
value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine.
326
The need for adequate deterrence of the defendant can support a high ratio.
327
Added to this reasoning, some federal courts, in minimizing the importance
of the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, have cited the existence of
the statutory cap. The Fifth Circuit, after finding that the employment
discrimination caps did not offend due process, added that "we have found in
punitive damages award to $22,500, a single-digit multiplier,.., and a total amount for
compensatory damages below the statutory cap .... ); Thomas v. IStar Fin., Inc., 508 F.
Supp. 2d 252, 263-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (remitting $1.6 million punitive damage award to
$190,000 under Gore guideposts where plaintiff had prevailed on both state law and Title
VII claims, with state claim not subject to cap and amount of applicable cap under Title VII
not apparent from opinion).
A few federal cases have declared a punitive damages award under a statutory cap to be
excessive, using the Gore guideposts, but stated that the court's review was for
nonconstituitional excessiveness rather than constitutional excessiveness. See Rubinstein, 218
F.3d at 407 (stating that "a more fully developed approach to assessing the Constitutionality
of a punitive damages award awaits a future day"); Deffenbaugh-Williams, 156 F.3d at 595
(characterizing Gore as "instructive" in evaluating defendant's non-constitutional
excessiveness challenge and stating that it "will not develop in detail the three [guideposts]
as will be necessary for a constitutional challenge").
325 See, e.g., Abner, 513 F.3d at 160 (upholding $125,000 punitive damages award for
violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against due process challenge when no
compensatory damages were awarded); Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., 271 F.3d 352, 359
(2d Cir. 2001) (upholding a $100,000 punitive damages award under Title VII when no
actual damages awarded); EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 515-16 (6th Cir.
2001) (stating that a $300,000 punitive damages award complied with due process when
only $1 awarded in compensatory damages); EEOC v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 616 (11th
Cir. 2000) (upholding a punitive damages award under Title VII that represented a 8.3-to-I
ratio to compensatory damages); Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 202 F.3d 1262,
1266, 1273 (10th Cir. 2000) (upholding a punitive damages award under Title VII that
represented at 59-to-I ratio to compensatory damages); ASARCO, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1049
(upholding $300,000 punitive damages award under Title VII when only nominal damages
of $1 awarded).
326 Gore, 517 U.S. at 582.
327 See, e.g., Mendez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1122 (9th Cir. 2008)
(noting that higher ratio may be warranted by the need to deter future misconduct); W&O,
213 F.3d at 616 (asserting that the second Gore guidepost "requires a court to ask whether a
relatively higher ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is permissible in order to effect
the deterrent purposes behind punitive damages").
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punitive damages cases with accompanying nominal damages, a ratio-based
inquiry becomes irrelevant. '328 The Second Circuit stated in a case upholding a
$100,000 punitive damages award, when neither actual nor nominal damages
were awarded, that "the [employment discrimination] statutory maxima capping
punitive damage awards strongly undermine the concerns [about unreasonable
verdicts by juries] that underlie the reluctance to award punitive damages
without proof of actual harm." 329 The reasoning of the Fifth and Second
Circuits would seem also to lessen the importance of a ratio-based inquiry in
reviewing an award of a bounded, legislatively created remedy.
I have argued that the doctrine of Gore/Campbell should not apply to
congressionally created remedies because such remedies are functionally
distinguishable in important ways from punitive damages. Even if this doctrine
were to apply, the example of courts reviewing punitive damages awards
subject to statutory caps shows that judicial deference to statutory maximums is
prevalent and strongly influences the due process inquiry.
D. Aggregation of Multiple Awards within Statutory Range
A common occurrence with legislatively created remedies, fines, and
sentences of imprisonment is that when the defendant has committed multiple
statutory violations, the remedies or sanctions for those violations may add up
to very large amounts. Aggregate awards of legislatively created remedies may
occur when the defendant has committed multiple violations of the statute
against a single plaintiff or several named plaintiffs. This was the situation in
Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset, because the defendants had infringed multiple
copyrighted works. 330 Aggregate awards may also occur in the class action
context, when a single type of statutory violation has affected many persons.331
328Abner, 513 F.3d at 164.
329 Cush-Crawford, 271 F.3d at 359.
3 30 Another example is an action in which a single plaintiff has received multiple
unsolicited "junk" faxes from the defendant in violation of federal law. See, e.g., Pasco v.
Protus IP Solutions, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 2d 825, 835 (D. Md. 2011) (in action under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, noting defendant's argument "that even if $500-
$1,500 in statutory damages are constitutional, an aggregate award, taking account of
hundreds of unsolicited faxes, could easily reach into the millions, and could therefore
violate due process").
331 See, e.g., Parker v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003)
(asserting "cf" cite to Campbell and Gore for the proposition that "it may be that in a
sufficiently serious case the due process clause might be invoked, not to prevent [class]
certification, but to nullify that effect and reduce the aggregate damage award" under federal
Cable Communications Policy Act, but finding that "these concerns remain hypothetical"
because class had not yet been certified); Green v. Anthony Clark Int'l Ins. Brokers, No. 09
C 1541, 2010 WL 431673, at *6 (N.D. 111. Feb. 1, 2010) (responding to defendants'
argument that if a class were certified, aggregated statutory damages would violate
Campbell, by stating "[t]he appropriate time to deal with that issue is later, if and after a
class is certified").
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Similarly, multiple fines or monetary penalties may be due the government for
multiple statutory violations.
Under many federal statutes, such as the civil False Claims Act 332 or the
Fair Credit Reporting Act,333 it is conceivable that a defendant might commit
thousands of violations. 334 Even if the lowest possible remedy or fine would be
imposed per violation, the aggregate award could be enormous. For example, in
one recent case under the False Claims Act, United States ex rel. Kurt Bunk v.
Birkart Globistics GmbH & Co.,335 the defendants submitted 9,136 false claims
to the federal government in the form of contract invoices; with a statutory
minimum penalty of $5,500 per false claim, the minimum total penalty would
have been over $50,000,000.336
Congress could act to avoid unduly harsh aggregated remedies or sanctions.
Indeed, it has done so in several contexts. Sometimes, Congress has imposed an
aggregate limit on remedies that it has created. 337 In the sentencing context,
Congress has created measures that give courts the power to lessen the length of
imprisonment that is available for multiple criminal offenses. Congress has
specified that multiple sentences of imprisonment imposed at the same time run
concurrently unless the court orders, or the governing statute mandates, that the
terms are to run consecutively.338 Federal courts have sometimes determined
that multiple fines for multiple criminal offenses are to run concurrently, with
the defendant only responsible to pay a single fine. 339 The Federal Sentencing
33231 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006).
333 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
334See, e.g., Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 953-54 (7th Cir. 2006)
(discussing potential class action with purported 1.2 million recipients of defendant's
solicitations in violation of Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, when statutory
damages range per violation was $100 to $1000); United States v. Bickel, No. 02-3144, 2006
WL 1120439 at * 1 (C.D. 111. Feb. 22, 2006) (involving 39,949 false claims for Medicare and
Medicaid payments in violations of the False Claims Act).335 Nos. 1:02cv 1168 (AJT/TRJ), 2012 WL 488256 (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 2012).
336The district court found the total sum unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines
Clause and imposed no penalty. Id. at *4.
337 See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (2006) ("In the case of a
class action, such amount as the court may allow, except that as to each member of the class
no minimum recovery shall be applicable, and the total recovery under this subparagraph in
any class action or series of class actions arising out of the same failure to comply by the
same creditor shall not be more than the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth
of the creditor."); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2006)
(same, except substituting "debt collector" for "creditor").
338 18 U.S.C. § 3584 (2006) ("Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at the same time
run concurrently unless the court orders or the statute mandates that the terms are to run
consecutively.").
339 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 506 (1943) (noting that district
court had imposed a $10,000 fine for each of the five counts but that a payment of $10,000
would discharge all fines); United States v. Allison, 264 F. App'x 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2008)
(recounting that defendant was sentenced to a fine for each of six counts, "to run
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Guidelines provide that all counts involving the same harm should be grouped
together, lessening the possibility of consecutive sentences in some
circumstances.340 Congress could take similar steps with respect to legislatively
created remedies, permitting or requiring courts to treat multiple awards for
multiple, similar offenses as concurrent.
Assuming that Congress has not limited the possibility of very large
aggregated awards of legislatively created remedies, the question becomes
whether such awards might be considered excessive under due process when the
amount per statutory violation is itself constitutional. The Supreme Court has
not had the occasion to determine whether an aggregated award of fines,
legislatively created remedies, or punitive damages in a given case would result
in a total so excessive as to violate the Constitution. In Williams, the Court
announced its "wholly disproportioned to the offense" standard in the context of
deciding whether a statutory remedial provision on its face violated due
process.341 In Bajakajian, the Court adopted its "grossly disproportional to the
gravity of the offense" standard under the Excessive Fines Clause in reviewing
a single asset forfeiture. 342 In setting and applying guidelines for whether
awards of punitive damages are grossly excessive under due process, the
Supreme Court has reviewed single awards.
Some commentators have argued that aggregated "statutory damages"
warrant review under Gore/Campbell-whether in the plaintiff class action
context or the context of a single plaintiff alleging numerous violations of the
same statute.343 A few lower courts have mentioned the possibility that statutory
damages awarded in a class action might be subject to review under
Gore/Campbell, without deciding the issue because of ripeness concerns. 344
concurrently"); United States v. Canova, 412 F.3d 331, 343 (2d Cir. 2005) (detailing that the
district court imposed a $1,000 fine for each of four counts, "to run concurrently").34 0 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.2 (2011); 3 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & SARAH N. WELLING, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE CRIMINAL § 551 (4th ed.
2011) (stating that the grouping provisions of "the Guidelines seek 'to provide incremental
punishment for significant additional criminal conduct' by providing some sentence
enhancement yet at the same time avoiding multiple punishment for 'substantially identical
offense conduct' (footnote omitted)); Kristen Orr, Fencing in the Frontier: A Look into the
Limits of Mail Fraud, 95 KY. L.J. 789, 808 (2006-2007) (acknowledging that Sentencing
Guidelines are not mandatory, but that "the grouping of counts alleviates the length of a
sentence").
341 See supra notes 203-17 and accompanying text.
342 See supra notes 237-45 and accompanying text.
343See, e.g., Barker, supra note 18, at 536-59 (arguing that Gore due process review
should apply when multiple statutory damages are aggregated); Scheuerman, supra note 18,
at 131-51 (arguing that Gore due process review should apply to statutory damages awards
in class actions).
344See, e.g., Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir. 2006) (in
actions for violations of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, citing Campbell for the
proposition that "[a]n award [of statutory damages] that would be unconstitutionally
excessive may be reduced" but adding that "constitutional limits are best applied after a class
has been certified"); Aliano v. Caputo & Sons, No. 09 C 910, 2011 WL 1706061, at *4
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For reasons offered in Part IV.C, whether an award of legislatively created
remedies is excessive under due process should not be informed by doctrine
developed to address jury awards of uncapped punitive damages. This
suggestion applies whether the context is a single award or aggregated awards.
As discussed in Part IV.A, apparently no federal court, prior to the district court
in Thomas-Rasset, had found an award of a legislatively created remedy to
violate the Williams "wholly disproportioned to the offense" due process
standard. Many cases upheld large aggregate awards for multiple statutory
violations. 345 These results are consistent with doctrine and precedents
addressing aggregation of punitive sanctions created and delimited by
Congress-fines and prison terms.
As described in Part IV.B, apparently no federal appellate court has held
that a traditional fine within legislative monetary boundaries-i.e., not an asset
forfeiture-was unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause. The federal
appellate courts have confronted many instances when relatively small fines
have totaled large sums because of multiple violations of the statute, yet no
decision found the total amount to violate the Clause. 346 The appellate courts
simply have not found aggregation to present a unique constitutional issue.
Consider the following statement by the 11 th Circuit, which upheld $700,000 in
(N.D. 111. May 5, 2011) (stating in class actions under the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act that "the Court cannot fathom how the minimum statutory damages award
for willful FACTA violations in this case.. . would not violate Defendant's due process
rights" (citing State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 429 (2003); BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 586 (1996))); In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., No. CMDL-
00-1369 MHP, 2005 WL 1287611, at *11 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2005) (stating that "the
excessiveness of statutory damages awards cannot be judged in the abstract" in the class
certification process, but adding that "[t]he factors that the court would consider in making
such a determination are similar to the 'guideposts' that the Supreme Court has identified in
the context of reviewing the reasonableness of a jury award" (citing Campbell, 538 U.S. at
418; Gore, 517 U.S. at 575)).
345 See supra note 224.
346 See, e.g., Moustakis v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 338 F. App'x 820, 822 (11th Cir.
2009) (upholding $700,000 total fine based on daily fines of $150 over fourteen years for
homeowners' failure to correct housing code violations when house was worth only
$200,000); Korangy v. U.S. FDA, 498 F.3d 272, 277-78 (4th Cir. 2007) (upholding penalty
of $3,000 for each of 386 mammograms performed after certification had lapsed for a total
of approximately $1 million); Qwest Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 427 F.3d 1061,
1069-70 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding total fine of $25 million for reporting violations under
the federal Telecommunications Act based on daily fines of $10,000 and $2,500); United
States v. Gurley, 384 F.3d 316, 325 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding daily fines totaling almost
$2 million over a period of seven years for defendant's willful failure to respond to EPA
information requests); San Huan New Materials High Tech, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 161
F.3d 1347, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (upholding $1.55 million in total fines for unfair
practices in import trade based on per violation per day fines of $50,000 for a total of $1.55
million); cf Nat'l Taxpayers Union v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., 302 F. App'x 115, 120-21 (3d
Cir. 2008) (upholding penalty of $ .50 per direct mail piece for a total amount $ 274,582
under a statute that allowed a penalty of up to $5,000 per offending piece of mail because it
did not fall within the Excessive Fines Clause as it was neither a "fine" nor "excessive").
2012]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
total fines (based on daily fines of $150) against the owners of a $200,000 home
for failing to bring their house into municipal code compliance: "Rather than
being grossly disproportionate to the offense, the $700,000 fine is, literally,
directly proportionate to the offense. '347
With respect to criminal sentencing (outside the contexts of capital offenses
and offenses committed by juveniles), the Supreme Court has indicated that
"successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences should be
exceedingly rare. '348 This is largely because of the deference due the
legislature's policy choices. The Court has, however, suggested that the
proportionality principle "would... come into play in the extreme
example... if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life
imprisonment. '349 This hypothetical presents a complete lack of proportionality
between the severity of the penalty and the offense-similar to the
disproportionality between the severity of forfeiting over $300,000 in currency
to Bajakajian's reporting offense.
Consider the following aggregation twist to the Court's parking
hypothetical. Assuming that a day in jail for a single overtime parking violation
is itself constitutional, would dozens of overtime parking violations produce a
total sentence so excessive that it would violate the Eighth Amendment Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause? Based on precedent, the answer would seem
to be "no." Thus far, excessiveness challenges to the total length of jail time for
multiple offenses running consecutively have been unsuccessful. 350 The federal
courts typically reason that as long as the sentence imposed for each offense
was within the limits of the relevant statute, the total sentence is not cruel or
unusual or unconstitutionally excessive. 351
If aggregated jail time for multiple offenses will rarely, if ever, run afoul of
the Constitution, then may aggregated legislatively created remedies or fines for
34 7 Moustakis, 338 F. App'x at 822.
348 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 22 (2003).
3491Id. at 21.
3501 constructed a query at http://www.lexis.com in the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
Combined database for: (consecutive w/4 sentenc!) w/12 (Eighth or cruel or due process),
and I did not find a case holding that consecutive sentences imposed were so excessive as to
violate the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Clause, or due process (query last
performed July 12, 2012). See also Cumulative or Consecutive Sentences, 33 A.L.R.3d 335,
§ 12, 372-75 (1970) (summarizing cases that reject Eighth Amendment challenges to
cumulative or consecutive sentences); cf United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th
Cir. 2001) (deciding that mandatory consecutive sentences imposed under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1) do not violate the Eighth Amendment).
351 See 33 A.L.R.3d 335, § 12, 372-75 (1970).
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multiple offenses be unconstitutionally excessive? 352 I suggest that in very rare
circumstances, the answer may be "yes." I return to the conclusions that I drew
from the Excessive Fines Clause precedents: (1) close judicial scrutiny of a
penalty imposed in a particular case is warranted when Congress authorized a
severe penalty for many types of offenses and the types of offenses vary
substantially in seriousness, and (2) with respect to traditional monetary fines,
courts usually presume that Congress created penalty ranges that are
proportional to the proscribed conduct. 353 From these conclusions, I suggest that
when a defendant committed multiple offenses that are at the less serious end of
a wide spectrum of statutorily proscribed conduct and the per-offense statutory
penalty is severe, it may not be appropriate for a court to presume that Congress
created a scheme that satisfies the constitutional requirement of proportionality.
The court might instead consider whether the defendant's culpability or the
plaintiffs or public's harm increased in linear fashion with each statutory
violation; in the absence of linear increase in culpability or harm, the aggregate
award might be unconstitutionally excessive.
Consider the civil False Claims Act, which covers a wide variety of
representations made to the federal government. 354 The statute imposes a severe
penalty-a mandatory minimum of $5,500 per false claim. 355 The mandatory
minimum per false claim means that the aggregated fine increases in linear
352 With respect to aggregated legislatively created remedies, it is interesting to compare
the perspectives of two district courts considering possible unconstitutional excessiveness.
Judge Gertner in Tenenbaum commented:
Someone who illegally downloads 1,000 songs may be more blameworthy than an
individual who illegally downloads only one, but it seems odd to say that his conduct is
1,000 times more reprehensible. Section 504(c) ignores this issue entirely, providing the
same statutory damages ranges for each infringed work no matter how many works are
infringed. Consequently, the aggregation of statutory damages awarded under section
504(c) may result in unconscionably large awards.
Tenenbaum 1, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 115 (D. Mass. 2010).
By contrast, in certifying a class action in one of the Napster music sharing cases, a
district court questioned why statutory damages in class actions should be singled out for
due process scrutiny:
In the absence of any theory to explain why the amount of statutory damages awarded
would expand faster than the size of the class, the assumption that class action treatment
exacerbates concerns about excessive damages awards is either a product of
mathematical error or based on the assumption that defendants who injure large number
[sic] of individuals are less culpable than those who spread the effects of their unlawful
conduct less widely.
In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., No. CMDL-00-1369 MHP, 2005 WL 1287611, at *11
(N.D. Cal. June 1, 2005).
353 See supra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
354 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006).
355 Id. § 3729(a)(7).
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fashion with each false claim. However, hundreds or thousands of false claims
may have been committed-varying in terms of seriousness-without the
defendant's culpability or the government's or public's harm seeming to
increase linearly. In these circumstances, it may be appropriate for a court to
find the aggregated penalty to be unconstitutionally excessive.
Birkart Globistics is illustrative. The court said of the minimum $50 million
aggregated statutory penalty applicable on the facts of the case: "[T]here is
nothing in the language Congress adopted in the [Act] that suggests that
Congress ever contemplated that civil penalties would be imposed at the level
required here under facts similar to this case. '356 Noting that the government
did not incur any demonstrable damages, the district court found that the total
penalties would be "grossly disproportional to the harm caused by the
[d]efendants" and thus in violation of the Excessive Fines Clause. 357
What, then, of aggregated awards of legislatively created remedies, which
are subject to due process review rather than review under the Excessive Fines
Clause? I suggest that, similar to my analysis under the Excessive Fines Clause,
an aggregated award may violate due process even if the amount per statutory
violation does not. A reviewing court should consider whether the statute
authorizes a substantial remedy for a wide variety of offenses, whether the
defendant's offense was at the less serious end of the spectrum of offenses, and
whether the defendant's culpability and the plaintiffs or public's harm did not
increased linearly with each statutory violation.
Returning to Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum as examples, the liability and
remedial provisions in the Copyright Act are relatively narrow and well-tailored
when compared to the criminal forfeiture statute involved in Bajakajian358 or to
356 United States ex rel. Bunk v. Birkart Globistics GmbH & Co., Nos. l:02cvl 168
(AJT/TRJ), 2012 WL 488256, at *10 (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 2012). The United States, in a case
involving 32,949 false billings submitted to Medicare and Medicaid, itself took the position
that the minimum total civil penalty for all the claims ($180 million) would violate the
Excessive Fines Clause. United States v. Bickel, No. 02-3144, 2006 WL 1120439, at *3
(C.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2006). The government sought a civil penalty of only $11,000 in addition
to treble damages of over half a million dollars. Id. at *4. The defendant had already been
sentenced to 60 months imprisonment and ordered to pay more than $2 million in restitution.
Id.35 7Birkart Globistics, 2012 WL 488256, at *11. The court also determined that it had no
authority to impose a penalty less than that mandated by the statute and thus imposed no
penalty at all. Id. Other courts have assumed they do have the power to impose penalties less
than that mandated by a statute if the mandatory minimum fines would violate the Excessive
Fines Clause. See id. (citing United States ex rel. Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d
1122, 1145 (N.D. Okla. 1999), United States v. Advance Tool Co., 902 F. Supp. 1011,
1018-19 (W.D. Mo. 1995), and United States ex rel. Smith v. Gilbert Realty Co., Inc., 840
F. Supp. 71, 75 (E.D. Mich. 1993)). The Supreme Court in Bajakajian expressly refused to
consider "whether a court may disregard the terms of a statute that commands full forfeiture"
and then impose forfeiture in a lesser amount. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337
n.11 (1998).358 See supra notes 237-59 and accompanying text.
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the False Claims Act.359 The direct economic harm to the recording companies,
small though it was, did increase linearly with each song that was downloaded
but not purchased. None of the aggregated awards in Thomas-Rasset and
Tenenbaum rose to the level of the gross mismatch between penalty and
defendant culpability/plaintiff harm that Bajakajian or Birkart Globistics
presented. Finally, the total amounts for the multiple songs infringed pale in
comparison to the large aggregated fines and lengthy prison sentences that
federal courts routinely have upheld. Thus, I suggest that the aggregated awards
in Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum did not violate due process.
A reviewing court's determination whether an award of a congressionally
created remedy is excessive under due process should be informed by the
deference due to Congress in creating the cause of action, the remedy, and the
monetary range for the remedy. By analogy to the deferential manner in which
federal courts have evaluated penalties under the Excessive Fines Clause, it
should be rare that a reviewing court will deem a legislatively created remedy to
be "wholly disproportioned" to the statutory offense. Presumably (but not
irrebuttably), Congress incorporated proportionality when it created and
bounded monetary remedies for statutory violations.
However, when Congress has authorized or required a severe remedy or
penalty for many types of offenses, with the types of offenses varying
substantially in terms of seriousness, a reviewing court perhaps owes less
deference to Congress when the actual violation is at the low end of the
seriousness spectrum. The possibility of unconstitutional disproportionality
between the remedy or penalty and the actual offense becomes heightened in
such a circumstance. Moreover, if the defendant has committed multiple
statutory offenses, the amount of aggregated remedies or penalties may be
constitutionally suspect if the defendant's culpability and the plaintiff's and
public's harm did not increase linearly with each statutory violation.
V. CONCLUSION
When a federal jury or trial judge has assessed the amount of a monetary
remedy created and bounded by Congress, judicial review for excessiveness
should be more circumscribed than when a jury or judge has assessed the
amount of a judicially created remedy. Nonconstitutional review of an award of
a congressionally created remedy should be limited to whether the award is
consistent with the relevant statutory language. If Congress enacted factors to
guide the trial decisionmaker's choice of amount within the monetary
boundaries set by the statute, then a reviewing court may consider whether the
amount of the award is unreasonable in light of those factors. If Congress has
not legislated factors to guide the selection of amount within the statutory range,
359 See supra notes 354-57 and accompanying text.
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then the trial decisionmaker's choice of amount within the range should not be
reviewed for excessiveness. In the absence of statutory factors, judicial review
for excessiveness would subvert the remedial authority of both Congress and
the trial decisionmaker.
With respect to constitutional review, federal courts may consider whether
an award of a legislatively created remedy is wholly disproportioned to the
defendant's offense and thus a violation of due process. In this evaluation,
courts should give appropriate deference to congressional judgments creating
the cause of action, the remedy, and the monetary boundaries of the remedy.
Courts should apply the due process standard as leniently as they have applied a
practically identical standard under the Excessive Fines Clause.
It may be, as a matter of sound policy, that some legislatively created
remedies should be more finely tuned so as to avoid harsh results. The source of
any fine tuning, however, should be Congress, which can choose to enact
gradations to statutory ranges, factors to inform the selection of awards within
statutory ranges, or limits on aggregate awards for multiple statutory violations.
Subject to constitutional constraints, curing "excessive" awards of legislatively
created remedies is the job of Congress, with courts having the power to review
only whether an award is consistent with the relevant statutory language.
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